Design Of Optimal Dynamic Contract With Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection Under Inflation Risk

With the development of society,we can find that,the incompleteness of contract has caused the attention of many scholars and lead them to do much in-depth research because of its widespread emergence and application in the real economic society.Besides,the incomplete contract theory is increasingly becoming the basic tool of enterprise theory,corporation strategy,corporation finance and corporation management,and acquirring the contract theory is the objective demand of the related economy areas.In addition,the survey found that dynamic moral hazard and adverse selection are often single or mixed together in the real econormic society,which make the actual problems become more complicated.At the same time,for an individual in the real contract-model economic society,inflation usually has a significant impact on individual's psychology and behavior,mainly reflected in the individual's contract strategy selection and individual's work status,etc.This paper deals with such problems by modeling.The main content of this paper is to study the impact of the moral hazard and adverse select on incomplete contract under the inflation risk.It consists of the following five parts:In the first part,it expounds the research background and significance of this paper.Then,the current research status at home and abroad is combed.Finally,the content and structure of the full thesis are summarized.In the second part,it studies the impact of the moral hazard of two kind agents on the optimal dynamic contract.In the framework,it mainly considers the impact of agents' moral hazard on the contract implementation and the contract survival.Firstly,it converts the nominal assets into the real assets.Secondly,it establishes the dynamic equations of the agent's continuation value utility as well as the principal,s total utility.After that,by the theory and methods of stochastic optimal control under the premise of linear expectation,it deduces the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)equation of the principal's value function,and the explicit expression of the optimal principal's payment and the agent's effort level.Finally,the numerical simulations are provided.In the third part,on the basis of the second chapter,it adds the adverse selection,a common economic behavior,into the model.It mainly studies the bad moral hazard agent's adverse selection problem.It adds the adverse selection into the model and solve the model by the dynamic programming principles,and get the explicit expression of the good moral hazard's payment and the agents' effort level.Finally,the numerical simulations are provided.In the fourth part,it considers the good moral agent's adverse selection problem.Similar to the way in the third part,it first sets up the model,and solve the model by the theory and methods of stochastic optimal control.In addition,it also writes the principal's optimal value function.Finally,it summarizes all the research results,and also points out our deficiency and the future research issue.