Legal Analysis For The Introduction Of Pluralistic Share Structure Institution

Share structure institution has always been the basis part for the overall legal framework of company law.With the improvement of the share structure organization,"one share,one vote" has gradually become the mainstream trend in the company law.And China has established a whole company share structure based on "one share,one vote"and with limited deviation.However,"one share,one vote" seems helpless in response to challenges several companies facing today,such as the contradiction between fund-raising and control maintaining over the company.The listing of alibaba and other emerging science and technology enterprises in the United States has further triggered the discussion about timely relax of the limitation of "one share,one vote",and the introduction of pluralistic share structure.In addition,United States,Japan and other countries have all experienced a revision process from strict compliance with the rule "one share,one vote" to adoption of pluralistic share structure.There is no optimal solution for the share structure.Its development requires the attention to the new needs and new practice model.Its structure should be constantly adjusted according to the dynamic development of the theory and practice needs.What's more,whether pluralistic share structure is a viable and controlled practice in our country,whether through supporting systems the merit of pluralistic share structure and the malpractice can be dealt are important issues worth our further studying.The essence of pluralistic share structure is to grant shareholders the right to configure different power of ownership together and create many different types.This share structure is not only the amendment to the theoretical foundation of "one share,one vote",but also coming from the practice,with superiority for the company itself,the founders,management and other related subjects,as well as solving the problem we facing today.When talking about the construction of pluralistic share institution in China,we first need to clarify which kind of power can be nullified,restricted or disparately reduced by shareholders.The different answer to the question whether company law of share structure should be recognized as arbitrary norms also decide the different route we should choose.But,all in all,the difference of shareholders power under pluralistic share structure may indeed cause damage to non-controlling minority interests by create super equity.This inherent risks must be reconciled within controllable range by better system arrangement.