Under The Principle Of Subsidiary, The Research On The Dilatation Of Regional Legislation

In 2015,the amendments to Legislation Law expanded the subject scope exercising local legislative power to the municipalities with districts.This local legislative power’s expansion not only responses a dominant idea of the central government’s current policy,“streamlining government and delegating authorities”,but more fills in the gaps at the end of government system in China.However,the local legislative power’s expansion is still facing many difficulties based on the realistic situation and need of current local development and governance: the legislative power stratification of “isomorphic responsibility” essentially hinders the exercise of local legislative power;but the realistic demand of “system competition” is calling for more legislative power to be delegated to the local government.Based on this,this paper is aimed to take use of the “effect” and “scale” factors of subsidiarity principle to provide ideas for the further expansion of the local legislative power.In this paper,the above problems are discussed on the theoretical elaboration,problem analysis and problem solving in five chapters:The Chapter I describes the current situation of the expansion of local legislative power and conducted analysis on the expansion demand from the horizontal and vertical aspect.There is no doubt that “the fully-endowed local legislative power of the municipalities with districts” is one of the most important amendments,which makes People’s Congress and its Standing Committee of municipalities with districts have the right to produce local laws and regulations,and the People’s Government of municipalities with districts has the right to produce local government rules and regulations,the subject of local legislative power has expanded from 49 municipalities to all municipalities with districts.All local governments respond actively to implement the legislative power of “municipalities with districts” effectively since the implementation of the amendments to Legislation Law,the prospects for the development of local legislative right are clear,and the local governance and national legal system will be enhanced to the new development level.The expansion demand of this local legislative right comes from the vertical division of power and horizontal cooperation of right: the vertical division of power strives to seek a “golden section point” between “limited central government” and “delegated local government”,and the horizontal power of cooperation seeks greater system competition space for local development under the major premise of ensuring the unification of legal system.In the Chapter III,the problems in current vertical local legislative competence allocation of China are clarified and analyzed from the vertical dimension based on the concept of “isomorphic responsibility”.The “isomorphic responsibility” represents that the different levels of governments have a high degree of unification and consistency on the vertical functions,responsibilities and structural establishments,it means that each level of government manages the same things in general,which correspondingly represents as “up-down adjustments and left-right alignment” on the structural establishment.The occurrence of this problem not only causes the dilemma of “overlapping legislation” to the central and local legislative competence,but also causes the obstacles to the provincial and municipal legislative subject to implement the local legislative power,these violate the original intention of the expansion of local legislative power.In the Chapter IV,the expansion demand of local legislative power in China is analyzed from the vertical dimension based on the concept of “system competition”.In accordance with the theory of “system competition”,the resources will automatically select a party with a lower system cost in the environment of the free flow of resources,the advantages of lower system cost can be internalized as a resource advantage.In this cycle,a party with a higher system cost will select to reduce its cost in order to attract more resources,but the other party with a system cost advantage will improve and optimize the system.So in the past,the resources between each system will spontaneously and automatically flow into a more favorable and effective party due to the cost fluctuation.This will form a kind of overall tend with mutual competition and mutual evolution among all kinds of systems.When facing the current demand of local governance,only more local competence delegated to the municipalities with cities can meet the urban development demand in the future competition,gives a broader competition space in different regions to from a virtuous cycle of system competition.After the situation analysis and theoretical analysis above in the Chapter V,we pursues the best “effect” of the implementation of local legislative power and takes the competence or matters of “scale” as a guarantee in view of the current situation and demand the expansion of local legislative power in China with a consideration of “scale” and “effect” factors in the subsidiarity principle.In the division of competence,the municipalities with districts make the legislative competence with the best “effect” to be delegated to the municipal legislative subject;in the intervention mechanism,the matters and competence of “scale” will be reverted to the provincial or above legislative subjects in order to ensure the legitimacy and rationality of the implementation of local legislative power and to put forward a new path for the expansion of local legislative competence.