On The Independence Of Anti-Corruption Agencies In The States Parties To The UNCAC In Perspective Of Principal-agent Theory

The United Nations Convention against corruption is the first international legal instrument that against corruption,which provides the guidelines for anti-corruption actions in most countries of the world.Since its entry into force in 2005,up to now,156 countries and regions have signed up and launched the campaign against corruption according to the requirements of the Convention,which has far-reaching implications.In the thirty-sixth article of the Convention,pointed out that "all States parties should take the necessary measures in accordance with the basic principles of their own legal system to ensure that one or more agencies are set up or arranged to fight corruption.At the same time,the Convention particularly emphasizes that "such institutions or staff members should have the necessary independence in accordance with the basic principles of the legal system of the States parties so that they can perform their functions effectively without any unjustified influence."The principal-agent relationship in economics refers to any transaction involving asymmetric information.The principal and agent refer to both sides of information superiority and information inferiority.The State entrusts more professional anti-corruption agencies to use state power to deal with corruption.There is a principal-agent relationship between the state and the anti-corruption institutions,and it will inevitably produce the agency problem.Therefore,we can use the principal-agent theory to analyze the interaction between the state and the anticorruption agencies.In the principal-agent relationship,the principal should set up various mechanisms to make the agent serve the client wholeheartedly and realize the maximization of the principal's own interests.At present,the independence of the anti-corruption institutions has become a common value standard in the national design incentive mechanism.Practice has proved that this standard can maximize the integrity and efficiency of anti-corruption agencies.However,it is difficult to avoid all kinds of agency problems between the state and the anti-corruption agencies.It is necessary for the state to formulate regulations for the supervision of the anti-corruption agencies.On the basis of the performance of the 36 articles of the Convention,some states parties exist some difficult in the formulation of specific rules for the realization of the independent value standards: the organizational form is notindependent,the space of financial activities is insufficient,the appointment and dismissal of personnel is disturbed,the power is insufficient,and the external supervision is absent.Anti corruption agencies also have internal oversight failures.In order to solve these problems,the state needs to rely on participation and incentive compatibility mechanism to stimulate and restrict the anti-corruption institutions,including: designing more independent and centralized organization form,reducing inter agency friction and functional overlap,giving institutional financial independence,and ensuring independent personnel relations.To provide security for office officials,to broaden the scope of authority,to realize the authority of institutions,to strengthen the internal supervision mechanism of the institutions and to improve the mechanism of external supervision of the institutions.With the exchange and intercommunication of international experience in building anti corruption agencies,and the long-term accumulation and continuous improvement of relevant practical experience of countries,It is reasonable to believe that the mechanism of the independence of the anti-corruption agencies will be more and more perfect.