Analysis Of Collusion With Algorithms By Antitrust Law

Collusion has always been the focus of the anti-monopoly law,especially for horizontal price collusion.Because of its great harm to competition,our country directly apply principle of per se rule to regulate in most cases.However,with the rapid development of computer science and technology,the extensive use of algorithms is changing the competitive landscape of operators and the way in which strategic decisions are made.It also increases the risk of collusion between operators.On the one hand,algorithms have changed the market structure in which collusion can be formed.The traditional framework can no longer be used to conduct theoretical research on collusion.On the other hand,the algorithm also provides operators with more methods of collusion,some of which may cause anti-competitive effect,but cannot be regulated by the existing anti-monopoly law.Therefore,it is necessary to reorganize the conspiracy regulation system,and to design the regulation system based on the difficulties that may arise in the process of the regulation of algorithmic collusion.The article is divided into four parts:The first chapter mainly analyzes the basic problem of algorithm collusion.The concept of algorithmic collusion is defined by analyzing the definition of collusion and summarizing the characteristics of the algorithmic collusion.Based on existing technologies and developing technologies,conclude the way that operators use algorithms to implement collusion.On this basis,analyze the competitive effect of algorithmic collusion compared with general collusion.The second chapter mainly analyzes the influence of algorithmic collusion on the traditional theory of antitrust law.Firstly,algorithms change the market structures of collusion.The application of algorithms allows operators to no longer rely on specific market structures,so that collusion can also occur in a market with dispersed market share and low market entry barriers.Secondly,the algorithms affect the motivation of the operators to achieve collusion by strengthening the purpose of profit incentives and reducing the illegal risks of collusion.At the same time,algorithms make collusion more stable.Because of the competitive relationship among the operators,the conspirators may have the incentive to betray the collusion by secret price cut.However,algorithms can effectively reduce the motivation of the operator to betray the collusion,thus increasing the loyalty of conspirators.The third chapter analyzes the scope of the algorithmic collusion regulated by anti-monopoly law and summarizes the potential regulatory difficulties.When regulating algorithm collusion,it is important to clarify its nature,and then choose the appropriate way of regulation.According to the role of algorithms in collusion,algorithm collusion can be divided into the explicit collusion with algorithms,the follow-up behavior with algorithms,the tacit collusion with algorithms,and the algorithm collusion between explicit collusion and tacit collusion.In accordance with the current regulation of horizontal price collusion,only the explicit collusion with algorithms could be subject to the antitrust law.However,algorithms can provide a contact point of tacit collusion,thereby increasing the risk of forming a tacit collusion and enhancing the anti-competitiveness of tacit collusion.In the Internet environment where information is rapidly changing and communicating,algorithms also offer possibilities for the price following behavior.The behavior of sharing algorithms can also result in anti-competitive effects under certain circumstances.Therefore,the above behavior cannot be completely excluded from the scope of antitrust regulations.However,because tacit collusion or the follow-up behavior with algorithms achieves without a clear agreement,it could not be regulated by the antitrust law.The behavior of sharing algorithms is also not subject to the regulation because the content of agreements does not conform to the definition of agreements in the antitrust law.In addition,the algorithmic collusion is harder to be detected which exacerbates the difficulty of regulation.The fourth chapter puts forward suggestions to regulate algorithmic collusion.In order to prevent the algorithm collusion from harming the competition,it is necessary to resort the path of the antitrust regulation.First,we need to expand the scope of agreement.Second,we need to choose the analysis model of anti-monopoly law.For the behavior of reaching agreements which explicitly restrict price,it still applies the principle of per se rule.For the case where the agreement does not explicitly stipulate the restriction of price,but virtually results in collusion,it should be analyzed through rule of reason based on the conspirators' market power,the way of collusion and the competitive effect of collusion.Finally,if there is no evidence proving that the operators have reached a collusion agreement,it can be presumed illegal by using supporting proofs.