Research On Self-dealing Of Directors Of SOEs

The conflict-of-interest nature of the self-dealing of directors in state-owned enterprises determines the risk in damaging the interests of state-owned enterprises and conveying the interests of the state.Directors in State-owned enterprises may transfer interest and these behaviors are more and more difficult to detected.Under the background of information asymmetry,the imbalances of internal governance structure,the lack of external justice and regulations of leave duty lead to the difficulty in constraint self-dealing of directors of SOEs.We should research on problems of self-dealing of directors of SOEs and improve legislation actively to adapt to the reform trend.Based on Empirical Research Methods and Comparative Research Methods,the writer intend to Explore the hidden characteristics and internal and external causes of self-dealing of state-owned directors by researches on the state-owned enterprise directors improper self-dealing cases.Furthermore the writer will research overseas legislation to help improve the legislation.This dissertation first analyzes the inherent characteristics of business operation and conflict of interests of self-dealing of state-owned enterprises,and further studies the multiple concealed forms of this transaction behavior.Then,the dissertation discusses the internal and external causes of this behavior for the purpose of providing a theoretical basis for legislation.This article starts with the two main logic lines: the legislative system construction and the judicial application with respect to the legal regulation of the self-dealing behavior of the state-owned enterprises.In terms of the establishment of the legislative system,we should firstly clarify the scope of the subjects of self-dealing,refine the ways of identifying the subjects of self-dealing,and expand the scope of the subject appropriately through scientific legislative techniques so as to cope with the concealment of the transaction Challenges;Secondly,this paper studies the drawbacks of existing procedural legislation in our country,tries to put forward reasonable legislative proposals in the process of compulsory information disclosure and non-interested person approval procedure.At last,this article realizes that the current legislation lacks the norms of directors 'Leave Duty,studies the theoretical foundation of directors' Leave Duty and proposes the suggestion of system construction,in order to provide relevant scientific legislation to supply the system.In judicial application,this paper firstly studies two important aspects of judicial review of SOEs' directors' self-dealing,procedural examination and substantive examination.This paper studies different mature legislation in different countries through comparative research and analyses the most suitable judicial standard according to the characteristics of Chinese SOEs.Finally,this paper advocates to clarify the limits and cohesion of the existing responsibility systems,clarify the scope of Ownership System,Damage Compensation System and other ways of civil liability.