The article adopts the means of case analysis thoroughly,and lists plenty of cases that support and object the procedural rights of most-favored-nation treatment respectively.The article deeply probes into the investors' incentives applying on procedural rights to most-favored-nation treatment to circumvent the host country's court waiting period,expand the scope of the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction,and incorporate more controversial dispute resolution mechanisms.Next,it discusses the effect of the application of most-favored-nation treatment in procedural rights to the host country which signs the basic treaty and even to the international order.In addiction,on the basis of the discretionary power of the dispute settlement mechanism,the article argues the reasons of different decisions in similar cases.Afterwards,based on the Vienna Treaty Law and related legal documents on most-favored-nation treatment,the article denies the legal basis for the application of most-favored-nation treatment in procedural rights.In fact,China has signed 128 BITs.Recently,Korean Ancheng Company v.China case and the China-ASEAN Agreement concerning most-favored-nation treatment terms all indicate that the application of most-favored-nation treatment procedural rights has gradually exposed problems in China.According to the status quo of application of procedural rights in most-favored-nation treatment terms in China,this article demonstrates how China should improve bilateral and multilateral treaties that have been signed and not signed under the circumstance that the procedural rights of most-favored-nation treatment clauses are currently applicable. |