Research On All-unit Discount Behavior Based On Tying

As market competition intensifies,all-unit discounts and tying become a common sales strategy.In general,it tends to be conducive to competition,but companies with market dominance perform these two behaviors at the same time.As a result,they tend to undermine competition and harm consumer welfare.Therefore,there are market forces and tying-type products.Loyalty discounts should be taken seriously.Many countries,such as the European Union and the United States,have already locked in the illegality of this typ e of commercial activity.China's commercial practices have remained on the price side and have not received sufficient attention.In November 2016,the State Administration for Industry and Commerce decided that the "Leila Case" as the first case of loyalty discounts broke the deadlock.The State Administration for Industry and Commerce changed the thinking of previous laws and put economics into the analysis of cases,which made the analysis more comprehensive,played a guiding role in the judgment of similar cases in the future,and promoted the improvement of China's"anti-monopoly law"system.The further development of the Anti-Monopoly Law is of great significance.Most scholars only study single tying behavior or loyalty discount behavior.Few scholars combine the two to study the illegality of quantitative discounts from the background of tying.Based on the perspective of law and economics,we first elicited the behavior of loyalty discounts and tying from typical cases,defined the concept of tying and quantity-based loyalty discount behaviors,and distinguished predatory pricing,price discrimination,tying and loyalty discounts.Second,it summarizes the anti-competitive effects of tie-in and loyalty discounts.In addition,the leading company tying product B through the product A market,and in the product market B,the implementation of quantitative loyalty discount behavior competes with the edge enterprises that only sell product B,and the customer selects according to the market information.A tripartite dynamic game model with a number of loyalty discounts in the context of tying was constructed,assuming that in the context of symmetrical information markets,the dominant companies in the context of tying,implementing corporate actions before and after the profit,consumer surplus,and society By comparing the total benefits,it is concluded that the consumer surplus and the total social surplus of the implementation of quantity-based loyalty discount behaviors are lower than the unimplemented cases.This concludes that companies with market dominance in the implementation of tying and quantitative loyalty discounts have anti-competitive effects.Finally,according to the existing legal provisions in our country and the reference by western countries for the enforcement of laws,some suggestions on the restriction of quantitative loyalty behavior in China are proposed,which will help to further perfect the "anti-monopoly law".