Environmental Administrative Public Interest Litigation System From The Perspective Of Power Balance

Since the theory of Power Restriction has been proposed and developed by Western bourgeois jurists and politicians,it has far-reaching significance not only for Western countries but also for other countries in the world.After studying and considering from the theory and practice,China has created a Power Allocation system that both restrictive and collaborative to suit China's power organs.Different from the macro-disposition of power in the West,the Administrative Public Interest Litigation(hereinafter referred to as "APIL")constructs the macro-disposition of power,which focus on procuratorate restrict administrative agency,and gives a new connotation of the administrative inspection.During the operation of the APIL procedure,The study found that it not only reflects the restriction of the procuratorial power on the administrative power,but also reflects the relationship between the procuratorial organ,the administrative organ and the judicial organ.In addition,once"third person" get into the procedure,it also reflects the supervision of right over power.From the perspective of power-balance,this paper analyzes the background and development process of the system of APIL,elaborates on the supervision method of the balance between multiple subject theoretically,and analyzes the actual supervision effect of the APIL system based on empirical data.The APIL system plays an active role in urging the administrative organ to correct illegal administrative actions and active performance of duties;however,there is still a real gap between the actual operational effects of the system and the ideal structure of the theory.The APIL system still lacks the ability of the grass-roots procuratorate to handle cases,supervises a low administrative behavior,one-sided concentration of illegal acts,and insufficient punishment for related staff,etc.In order to achieve the goal of "supervising and promoting administrative behavior and safeguarding the public interest",that issues are also directions of the APIL system to perfect in the future.Finally,the judicial power supervise the administrative power must follow the principle of judicial self-control,respecting the power expertise,and maximizing the role various organs in the control of social affairs.This article is divided into six parts.The first part is "Proposing problem." It points out that it is inconsistent between China's power ownership and power subject,and environmental administrative organ are affected by factors such as power rent-seeking,economic efficiency,the enforcement difficulties of environmental law,etc.In addition,there are serious "environmental administrative failures",which has caused great damage to society and public interest.Therefore,the restriction and supervision of power is imperative.The second part is "The origin:the contradiction between negative externalities and green mountains." It introduce the background and development history of APIL system.The APIL has experienced five stages that are top-level design,legal authorization,pilot advancement,legislative guarantee,and comprehensive advancement.It is based on the negative externalities of economic construction,the requirements for building a law-government,insufficient administrative enforcement,existing laws and the judiciary.In conclusion,exsiting system is inefficient to maintain the social public interest and other backgrounds.The third part is "Content:institutional innovation under the constitutional framework."APIL system is innovative under the China constitution,which is mainly reflected in the role of procedural and to start up procedures actively.The targeted object is environmental administrative organ's illegal performance or non-performance,which embodies the administrative and legal supervision of the administrative organ by the procuratorial organ.The fourth part is "Restrict and Balance:the Chinese model." In the process of APIL,there are various ways of power balance.First of all,the procuratorial organ have two kinds of supervision modes:Procuratorial Suggestions and Public Interest Litigation.The supervision of Procuratorial Suggestions is mainly reflected in three fields:the role of procuratorial organ;investigation ways;supervision and follow-up;the supervision of the procedural is mainly divided into wining the case and losing two situations.Secondly,the court and the procuratorate have embodied the characteristics of power's division and cooperation in the litigation process.Finally,we should pay attention to protecting the rights of "third person" and keep them away from power struggles.The fifth part is"Reflection:the power-balance's effects of APIL." Based on the relevant data,the actual supervision effect is analyzed from both sides.The system safeguards the social public interests such as environmental protection and ecological resources;it vigorously urges the administrative organ to perform their duties legally and correct illegal acts,solves the predicament of self-monitoring by administrative organ;improves the national governance system and power allocation system,and produces the law-government construction.At the same time,we should recognize that the system still has some problems.For example,the APIL system still lacks the ability of the grass-roots procuratorate to handle cases,supervises a low administrative behavior,one-sided concentration of illegal acts,and insufficient punishment for related staff,etc.The sixth part is "The conclusion":reiterated the theme.The APIL system has created a new mode of China's power balance.Under the new judicial reform background,we must adhere to the correct path to improve the APIL.At the same time,exerting a more effective role power balance should follow the principle of maximum power function.