Research On Anti-monopoly Law System Of Concentration Of Undertaking Of Data-Driven Enterprise

With the development of Internet technology and algorithm technology,data-driven enterprises have become the most representative type of enterprises.In the process of competition in data-driven enterprises,concentration of undertakings as a common means of development.However,the concentration of undertakings in data-driven enterprises is constantly facing challenges.Since the acquisition of Double Click by Google,a series of data-driven business operator concentration cases such as Facebook's acquisition of WhatsApp case,Didi's acquisition of Uber case and Grab's acquisition of Uber case have attracted great attention in the society.In the face of these cases,the first difficulty faced by the review body is how to determine the thresholds for prior notification.The clarity of traditional thresholds for prior notification seems to be declining,which makes it difficult to apply.But the main difficulty is not that.The definition of relevant markets,the evaluation of market power and the evaluation of competitive impact have become controversial aspects.The blurred boundaries of relevant product markets and the geographic reference markets,the complexity of multilateral markets and platform competition make it difficult to define relevant markets;the uncertain degree of market impact caused by data,the decline of market share and the emergence of new technologies make it difficult to evaluate market forces;the rapid changes in market competition and the blurred nature of competition lead to the complexity of evaluation of competition impact.In summary,these difficulties are closely related to the characteristics of data-driven enterprises,such as network effect,dynamic competition and destructive innovation.This paper combines the practical exploration and research results of the centralized review of data-driven enterprise operators at home and abroad,and tries to find suggestions that are conducive to solving the problem of the concentration of undertakings of data-driven enterprises in China.First of all,the paper discusses the anti-monopoly review concept of concentration of data-driven enterprises,and advocates that the standard of consumer welfare should be adopted as a review concept,and a more prudent and flexible supervision method should be adopted.In order to avoid affecting market competition,the review agency should tolerate the wrong cost caused by the concentration of the competition,and recommend the adoption of the transaction amount standard and explore the consumer quantity standard for review.Secondly,for the definition of relevant markets,it is necessary to clarify the essence of competition,pay attention to the number of relevant markets,and other factors,and to define the relevant markets in the bilateral market,especially under free conditions.Thirdly,for market power assessment,this paper believes that the role of data in competition cannot be ignored.It is necessary to comprehensively consider all factors such as new technology and privacy,and accurately evaluate market forces through time dimension.At the same time,the market power of data-driven enterprises is also likely to be transmitted through transmission effect.Finally,for the competitive competition impact assessment,it is proposed to clarify the dimension of privacy as non-price competition,consider the consumer welfare standard as the measurement standard and comprehensively consider the competition factor.As the conclusion and the innovation of this paper,it is proposed that when making a review decision on the case of concentration of undertakings in data-driven enterprises,the review bodies should be more cautious than before,take no impact on market competition as the premise,make as few decisions as possible to prohibit concentration,and replace the prohibition of concentration by conditional relief measures and strengthening supervision after the event.