Research On Perfecting The Shareholder's Right To Know System Of China's Limited Liability Companies

In the modern company system,due to the separation of ownership and management,the actual control of the company has been transferred from the shareholders' meeting to the board of directors.At this time,how to prevent the moral risk and slack tendency of agents becomes the difficulty of corporate governance,and the moral risk and slack are caused by the information asymmetry between the two.In order to seek the protection of the system,the company law endows shareholders with the right to know.As an instrumental and fundamental right,it plays an important role in balancing the interests of shareholders,directors and senior managers.However,the company law amended in 2005(hereinafter referred to as "the company law of 2005")is too principled for the shareholders' right to know of limited liability companies.At the same time,it also fails to stipulate the system of the right of claim for inspection candidates in countries with developed legal systems.Therefore,the shareholders' right to know system in China's current company law is not enough to support various difficulties encountered in judicial trials in recent years.For example,in the right of access,the current legislation does not clarify such issues as "identification of subject qualification","definition of object scope","definition of improper purpose" and "distribution of burden of proof".In terms of the right of inquiry,the legal text does not clarify such issues as "the definition of the scope of the object","the subject of the obligation of explanation" and "the litigation mechanism".There is no "one word" in the construction of the system of the right of claim for the inspection candidates.Based on the above problems and combining with a large number of cases for empirical research,this paper tries to build a shareholder's right to know system in line with the rule of law in China,so as to protect shareholders' exercise of other rights.