The "Security Discount Rate" And The Alliance Adjustments In Hegemonic Alliance

This paper discusses the mechanism of hegemonic alliance's adjustment.As the hegemony,the United States seek to maximize safety and minimize the cost of maintaining the Alliance,then under what circumstances,US is more concerned about the safety maximized? Under what circumstances,US is more concerned about the cost of maintaining minimized? This article intends to use the "security discount rate" as an argument to explain the adjustment of the hegemonic alliance.When hegemony state encounter strong external and internal challenges,it has higher security discount rate,it concerns security more,it needs for higher security,compared to minimize costs,hegemonic state is more concerned about the safety maximized;when hegemonic state external security environment improved,more stable within the alliance,it has lower security discount rate,it concerns more about future security,this time compared to the maximum security,hegemonic state is more concerned about the costs being minimized.This paper selects the US-Japan alliance as a case to the theory testing.