Political Connection、CEO Power And Financial Fraud

For a long time,the problem of financial fraud in the capital market has been a difficult problem for both the practical and academic circles.The distortion of accounting information caused by financial fraud and the cost of agency problems have swept the whole capital market.The year 2017 is the year of China’s capital market supervision.From the appearance of the strictest trial committee,the price ticket,and the takeover of the state,the capital market is undergoing profound changes in China.The nineteen major reports of the party stressed that the Chinese government should continue to deepen the reform of the financial system,make good precautions against resolving financial risks,and promote the healthy development of the multi-level capital market.Improving the quality of accounting information is particularly important in this battle.Where to go to prevent financial fraud? Based on the special institutional background of our country and the resources difference of the market subject,the size of CEO power has become the driving force of financial fraud in the capital market,and the irrational factors of political connection have further increased the risk of financial fraud and the real goal of financial report.The standard is difficult to reach.In the past,the research on financial fraud is based on the analysis of motivation and empirical analysis,and the emphasis on internal governance and top-level design.In view of this,this article,based on the soft factors of the enterprise,follows the framework of the political umbrella barrier—CEO power motivation—financial fraud,and systematically expounds the relationship between political connection,CEO power and financial fraud.In this paper,the study samples of all listed companies in all A shares for 2008-2016 years,using multiple regression model to carry out empirical analysis and robustness test on the impact intensity of "disaster causing factors".The research found that the CEO power is positively related to the occurrence of financial fraud,and the non state owned enterprises are more significant than the state-owned enterprises.And,as intermediate adjustment variables,the political connection will aggravate the positive relationship,which is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.The main contribution of this paper is to make a breakthrough in the perspective of the research,and further analyze the causes and governance of the financial fraud from the soft factors of the enterprise and the owner’s control right,which can help to push the equity of the capital market,improve the efficiency of the capital market governance,and adapt to the healthy development of the capital market in our country in the new era.We need to make explorative attempts and breakthroughs in theoretical value and practical value.The full text of the total six chapters,the specific content is arranged as follows:In the first chapter,the background of the study,the review and research framework of relevant literature at home and abroad,the purpose and significance,and the innovation of this paper are summarized.In the second chapter,the basic theories and related concepts are defined and summarized.In the third chapter,the relationship between political connection,CEO power and financial fraud is analyzed systematically,and the research hypothesis is put forward.In the fourth chapter,the multiple regression model is constructed,and the hypothesis is empirically analyzed and the robustness test is carried out.The fifth chapter,based on the actual background of China’s securities market and system,puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.In the sixth chapter,the conclusions of the full text are summarized,and the shortcomings of the research are evaluated and analyzed,and then the future research is expected.