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The Law And Economics Analysis Of Lenient Punishment For The Admission Of Guilt And Acceptance Of Penalty

Posted on:2021-01-02Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q HuangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2416330602982246Subject:legal
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As a part of the reform of the judicial system,the lenient punishment for the admission of guilt and acceptance of penalty can effectively promote the defendant's guilty admission and punishment,reduce the burden of prosecution and the consumption of penalty resources,and improve the efficiency.However,while the new system improves efficiency,it will also bring some new problems and challenges The purpose of this paper is to analyze the system of admission of guilt and punishment from the perspective of legal economics,to study how to improve the efficiency value of the system,and to solve the negative problems brought by the system.This paper adopts the method of legal economics to analyze the system,and studies the efficiency value of the two dimensions of the system,so as to promote the improvement of the system.On the one hand,the purpose of this study is to study the defendant's behavior in the system,analyze whether the system can effectively affect the defendant's confession,and further study how to improve the confession rate of the defendant by changing the relevant variables in the system.On the other hand,this paper studies the changes of social welfare brought about by the lenient punishment for the admission of guilt and acceptance of penalty,studies the impact of the system on the welfare of the whole society,and analyzes how to improve the system to increase social welfare.In order to reach the goal of research,this article USES the expected utility analysis method,to establish the defendant pleaded guilty expectation model,calculate the condition of the defendant's confession,and analyze several important variables in the system of the influence of the defendant guilty plea:sentence and the defendant the expected probability of punishment is higher,the defendant pleaded guilty to forfeit.The risk preference of the defendant affects the tendency of guilty admission and punishment.When the lenient result of guilty admission and punishment is regarded as a kind of benefit,the risk-averse defendant is more likely to plead guilty and punishment,while the risk-loving defendant is more likely to plead not guilty.At the same time,through the cost-benefit analysis method,the following conclusions are drawn:due to the change of unit cost of penalty resources,in order to achieve effective allocation of resources,it is necessary to reduce the proportion of penalty severity cost in the total cost.The lenient punishment for the admission of guilt and acceptance of penalty greatly reduces the severity cost of punishment,which is in line with the trend of optimizing the allocation of penalty resources,and can effectively optimize the allocation of penalty resources and improve social welfare.The innovation of this paper,the new approach is to use law and economics analysis on system of greater confessed forfeit,scale for efficiency evaluation of the system,at the same time,using the theory of new tools to make a thorough and comprehensive analysis system,and find out the way to improve system,such as through setting commutation specification sentencing and gradient,strengthen the discovery,multiple penalty ways,using the methods of risk preference difference guide pleaded guilty,the defendant can effectively improve the defendant pleaded guilty to forfeit rate;It can effectively reduce the loss of the system and increase social welfare by preventing unjust,false and wrong cases,balancing and protecting the victim's rights and interests,and giving play to the supplementary role of non-legal methods.
Keywords/Search Tags:lenient punishment for the admission of guilt and acceptance of penalty, legal economic analysis, expected benefits, risk appetite, social welfare
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