Empirical Study On The Judgment Of Disputes Of Shareholders' Right To Know In China

Shareholders' right to know is a right that has basic status and instrumental value given to company shareholders in order to protect the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium shareholders.Its purpose is to alleviate conflicts caused by information asymmetry between shareholders and the company,and to achieve a balance of interests between the two.China's "Company Law" and "Company Law" Judicial Interpretation IV have initially established the shareholder's right-to-know system,but the formulation of the law and the improvement of the system are not a day's work.There are still loopholes and shortcomings in China's existing shareholder's right-to-know system,leading to different opinions of courts on similar cases,making it difficult to form a unified judgment.The author selects shareholder right-to-know cases heard in the National High People's Court from 2014 to 2019,and uses statistical analysis and typical case analysis to conduct an empirical analysis of these cases.It is found that in China's judicial practice,there are major differences in the four issues of "the subject of shareholders' right to know","the scope of shareholders' right to know","the limitation of legitimate purposes",and "the method of exercising pre-procedure".The author has researched the judge's judgment logic of these dispute-related cases,and found the deficiencies of the trial logic in practice,and proposed the following perfect suggestions for the above issues from the perspective of benefiting China's judicial trial practice: Decide whether to allow the anonymous shareholder to exercise the shareholder's right to know according to whether the company knows the shareholding agreement between the anonymous shareholder and the nominal shareholder,defective shareholders can exercise the shareholder's right to know;the scope of the shareholder's right to know should be expanded to allow shareholders to consult the company's accounting vouchers;the burden of proof should be allocated reasonably,the "legitimate purpose" should be clearly restricted,and an inspector system should be introduced;stipulating that the pre-procedure is a mandatory procedure for shareholders' right to know.