Research On The Anti-monopoly Regulations Of Digital Platforms Abusing Market Dominance

Over the past ten years,digital platforms have shown unusual activity in concentration,and the Internet market is moving from a male roe to an oligopoly.As the market forces of the giants gradually become stronger,the dangers of the abuse of market dominance with the characteristics of the digital economy that they have implemented gradually appear,and the demand for antitrust law enforcement is increasing.However,the antitrust legal system that emerged from the traditional economic background,the response is weak,and the incompatibility between law enforcement needs and the status quo of legislation is increasingly prominent.The reason is that the digital economy with new characteristics has exceeded the range of the traditional antitrust legal system.In particular,the problems caused by data are almost unfounded in the traditional antitrust legal system,which is posing the biggest obstacle to the application of antitrust laws in the digital economy.Therefore,following the development of the digital economy,it is particularly necessary to strengthen our antitrust legal system.Digital platforms abuse market dominance and refusal to trade data,technological tying,and price discriminatory behavior that endangers competition and consumer interests,and is therefore accountable in the sense of antitrust law.However,China’s current antitrust legal system has many deficiencies in dealing with these three typical illegal acts.Essential facility doctrine as an effective measure to deal with the refusal of transactions has long been precedents in Europe and the United States,but it is difficult to effectively apply in China’s anti-monopoly law enforcement.The reason is that China’s anti-monopoly legal system does not extend the essential facility doctrine to the field of data,and the scope to which this principle applies is still controversial.If the regulatory obstacle to refusal to trade data is mainly reflected in the absence of law,the regulatory obstacle to technological tying mainly comes from the irrationality of the law.In judicial practice,China has imposed an excessively high burden of proof on the plaintiff,combined with the existing independence standards and compulsory standards that are difficult to adapt to technological tying,which has made it difficult to effectively regulate technological tying.Regarding the regulation of price discrimination,the predicament is mainly due to the difficulty of the antitrust legal system to effectively deal with data issues.This itself is beyond the scope of the traditional antitrust legal system,but considering that data issues are directly related to whether price discrimination can be effectively implemented,This issue must be resolved.In addition,the lack of technical level of law enforcement also constitutes one of the obstacles to the regulation of price discrimination.In order to effectively regulate the above-mentioned illegal activities that abuse the dominant position in the market,it should be improved from the two aspects of improving legislation and improving law enforcement technology.In order to effectively regulate the behavior of rejecting to trade data,essential facility doctrine should be cited in the data field,and the scope of application of the essential facility doctrine should be clarified on the basis of strictly limiting ideas.The scope of open data transactions should also be limited to data provided by users voluntarily,so as to avoid excessive damage to operator investment and innovation.In order to solve the anti-competitive threat caused by technological tying,the defendant’s burden of proof should be appropriately increased,the demand standard should be used as the standard to define the independence of the product,and the mandatory standard should be applied more flexibly,so that more tying activities that hinder competition will be included.When regulating price discrimination,we can try to creatively construct a multi-sectoral law and parallel regulatory strategy,supplement the inherent shortcomings of the antitrust legal system with other sectoral laws,and attach importance to the use of the commitment system on the basis of enhancing the auditability of algorithms so that gain good enforcement results at a relatively low cost.