Research On Risk Governance Of Large Shareholder Equity Pledge Of Listed Companies

The purpose of this paper is to analyze and study the risks that exist in the pledge of large shareholder equity of listed companies,and then propose how to reduce the series of risks that the large shareholder brings after the equity pledge.The main risk studied in this paper is the negative externalities caused by the large shareholder's equity pledge transaction to third parties.Generally speaking,the large shareholder has an important role in the company's operation and development,but the pledge behavior of the large shareholder will lead to cash flow rights and The degree of separation of control has been further increased.Once the pledge behavior of large shareholders is neglected,it will easily lead to the occurrence of opportunistic behavior,which will damage the interests of creditors,companies and small and medium shareholders.The relationship between the pledgor and the pledgee's claims and pledge is regulated by contract law and other private laws.However,the negative externalities arising from the pledge transaction of large shareholders 'equity have not been regulated,and the corporate governance issues caused by the pledge of equity have not been supervised.That is how to prevent opportunistic behavior caused by the hollowing of voting rights after the pledge of large shareholders' equity? How to protect the interests of other shareholders of the company and the interests of the company? Therefore,the author takes the principal-agent theory as the research object,and puts forward his ownopinions and suggestions on how to manage the negative externalities caused by the pledge of large shareholders' equity.The research methods used in this article mainly include case analysis and comparative analysis.,Chapter I quoted the case of Ying Fangwei to put forward the external risks that exist in the current pledge of large shareholders' equity;Chapter II analyzes the current legislative and judicial status of equity pledges and concludes that the existing private law system only pledges and pledges The rights and obligations of the people are adjusted,and the external risks caused by the equity pledge are not regulated,that is,the hollow voting rights formed by the equity pledge of large shareholders are not restricted,the voting rights of small and medium shareholders cannot be realized,and the equity pledge of large shareholders There are still loopholes in the disclosure of information,etc.Chapter III analyzes the government's bailout measures and the situation of some enterprises being assisted.It is concluded that the government's attempt to use financial assistance to solve negative externality risks also has problems.Other opportunistic behaviors have emerged that are difficult to solve;Chapter IV of this article combines the theory of law and economics and uses a comparative analysis method to target the pledge of equity and corporate governance between the United States,Germany and Taiwan in China,The comparison results in a governance method suitable for our country;finally,according to the previous description,specific measures are proposed to reduce the negative externality risk brought by the pledge of large shareholders 'equity,such as restricting the hollow voting rights of large shareholders,and constructing a unified voting right collection system 1.Incorporate the financing flow of the major shareholders into the scope of disclosure,increase the illegal costs,etc.,thereby reducing the opportunistic behavior of the major shareholders in the pledge of equity and safeguarding the interests of the company,other shareholders and pledgee.