A Study On The Protection Of Minority Shareholder In Listed Company's Volunteering Delisting

The cases in which listed companies take the initiative to withdraw from the market have become more frequent in China in recent years.In 2015,ST Duo took the initiative to delist the Shanghai Stock Exchange and became the first listed company in China to take the initiative to withdraw from the market due to the resolution of the shareholders' meeting.In the process of the active delisting of listed companies,the protection of the rights of small and medium shareholders is of paramount importance.This paper takes the typical case of the listed company's active delisting as the entry point,analyzes the current situation of the protection of small and medium shareholders and the existing problems in the actual case of the listed company's active delisting,and the minority shareholders' right to know,decision-making and dissident shareholders The three major rights of purchase claims are centered,combined with the current legal and regulatory design in China and the existing system of overseas capital markets,to provide insights on the protection of small and medium-sized shareholders in the active delisting of listed companies in China,with a view to protecting minority shareholders.There will be a more robust system in the future.The full text of this article is about 35,000 words.The main contents of the body part include:The first part,the listed company takes the initiative to delist the market: take "ST double" and "ST Shangpu" as an example.This part mainly analyzes the two typical cases of listed companies' active delisting-"ST double" and "ST Shangpu",and analyzes the framework design of the current delisting of listed companies in China.This part analyzes the reflection of the delisting system design of two cases and the protection of the rights of small and medium-sized shareholders in the delisting market,which leads to the problems in the protection of small and medium-sized shareholders in listed companies,which is the protection of minority shareholders in listed companies.Theory and institutional design provide a practical basis.The second part is the theoretical analysis of the protection of minority shareholders' rights and interests of listed companies taking the initiative to withdraw from the market.First of all,this part defines the connotation and division of the small and medium shareholders of listed companies,and determines the specific protection object of the system design.Secondly,in the active delisting of listed companies,the three main rights enjoyed by small and medium-sized shareholders—information right,decision-making power and responsibility of dissident shareholders' repurchase claims—are introduced,and the connotation of the rights of minority shareholders in listed companies is clarified.On the basis of clarifying the connotation of rights,this part explains the theory of protection of small and medium shareholders from the perspective of economics and law.At the same time,based on the theory,it analyzes the principles of honesty and credit and the principle of risk sharing.The basic principle.The theoretical basis mainly includes the theory of economics and the theory of law.Starting from the principal-agent theory,the theory of public interest,the theory of information asymmetry and the theory of fairness and justice in law,combining the principle of risk sharing and the principle of honesty and credit,the following The system design laid the theoretical foundation.The third part is the analysis of the existing legal system of minority shareholders protection in China.The content of this part is based on the current protection of small and medium-sized shareholders in China's existing laws and regulations,and summarizes and analyzes the existing systems and existing deficiencies in China.This part analyzes the legislative status of the small and medium shareholders' right to know,decision-making and dissent shareholders' repurchase claims.At the same time,it starts from the current legislative situation and summarizes the shortcomings in the current legal system design.At present,China's laws and regulations on the protection of small and medium-sized shareholders are relatively low-level,and the relevant provisions are relatively broad and belong to the principled provisions.For the small and mediumsized shareholders' right to know,decision-making and dissent shareholders' repurchase claims,there is no specific system design,which may eventually result in the rights of small and medium-sized shareholders not being implemented in actual cases.In the fourth part,the listed company actively withdraws from the market and the minority shareholders' protection system is perfected.This part is the summary part of the full text.By summarizing the previous cases,theories and the current legislative situation,this paper puts forward reasonable ideas and suggestions for the system design of the protection of small and medium shareholders who take the initiative to delist the listed companies in China.This part provides suggestions on the system design of the minority shareholders' right to know,decision-making power and dissident shareholders' repurchase claims.Before proposing the proposal,this part analyzes the system design of the protection of minority shareholders in other capital markets abroad.For different rights,from the different aspects of the exercise of rights,the form of rights,the connotation of rights and the relief of rights,The system of protecting the rights of small and medium-sized shareholders abroad was constructed.Based on this,combined with China's special national conditions and market conditions,the author put forward specific ideas for the construction of the protection system of three rights.