The Balancing Of Legal Interests In The Context Of Constitutionality Review

The study of the balancing of legal interests can reveal its rational structure and perfect the procedure of constitutional review.The balance of legal interests needs to be effective through the application of the principle of proportionality in the constitutional review.Since 2017,China's "rule by law' has taken a crucial step,and the improvement of "constitutionality review' is imperative.Although this ideal-filled discourse has already been implemented,how to make it take root needs to be studied and promoted by specific measures.The principle of proportionality plays an important role in restricting the abuse of public power and protecting basic rights.Among them,whether the balance of legal interests with core status can be put into the room still needs further research in theory and practice.As far as the balance of legal interests is concerned,it itself faces a lack of rationality.On the other hand,the doubt lies in the lack of rationality and logic in the balance structure itself.The first chapter of this article aims to raise the question.The actual basis of the legal interests balance comes from the establishment of China 's constitutional review system and the recognition of the principle of proportionality at the constitutional level.In order to better realize the protection of basic rights,the theory of legal interest balance as a requirement of the narrow proportional principle procedure Research becomes the top priority.Among the challenges faced by the balancing between law interests,the most important are the questions about structural rationality and conclusional rationality.The second chapter mainly expounds the basic principle of the balance of legal interests.First,define the connotation and extension of the concept of legal interests balancing-off,distinguish between the concept of interest measurement,and elaborate the requirements of the conflict of basic rights for the legal interest balancing;Secondly,take the German Rebach case as an example to show the general method of legal interest balancing in the German Federal Constitutional Court;Then,taking Alexey's balancing theory as an example,it elaborated the deepening of the legal-profit balancing theory.The third chapter is to display and refute the challenges faced by the balancing between legal interests,and to raise new issues based on case analysis and opinion display.First of all,it refutes the three main criticisms.These criticisms are based on the criticism of structural rationality,and also include discussions on the quality of the argument.Then,through the latest jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court,the feasibility of the legal interests balancing formula is analyzed,and the relevant theories are further evaluated to dismantle and justify.The fourth chapter improves the balance of legal interests in theory and reality.For the theory of the balance of law interests,the rationality and logic of its formula structure are recognized,and the consideration factors and assignment methods involved are separately verified to improve the structural framework.For practical considerations,based on China's existing power system,the division of power and censorship density of different power organs are demonstrated,and through the requirements of civic participation and theoretical argumentation,the rationality of the legal interests balance theory is maximized to make it possible been accepted.