Study On The Perfection Of Civil Emergency Safety System In China

In today's countries under the rule of law,in order to ensure social stability and security,national laws generally stipulate that violence is monopolized by the state,that is,individual citizens are not allowed to use violence.However,in the case of imminent threats to legitimate rights and interests,citizens have been unable to protect their legitimate rights and interests through public relief.At this point,if we continue to adhere to the principle of "state monopoly violence",it is obviously not conducive to protecting the legitimate rights and interests of individual citizens.Hence the law: "there is no law in a state of emergency." Justifiable defense and emergency are two rights that the law grants to citizens to protect themselves and others by means of violence under the state of emergency.In recent years,the research results of justifiable defense emerge one after another,and the theory of justifiable defense has made great progress.In contrast,the research on emergency risk aversion is still weak,and the theory of emergency risk aversion has not made significant progress.Based on this,this paper intends to study the concept,type,subject and degree of liability of emergency risk aversion in China's civil law,so as to contribute to the theoretical and legislative development of emergency risk aversion in China.This paper consists of three chapters:The first chapter mainly sorts out the basic theory of emergency hedging,and puts forward a new theory about the justification of emergency hedging and the limit condition.The second chapter through the case analysis of China's civil emergency system defects and deficiencies for the innovation of the system has new thinking.The third chapter is the focus of this article.This chapter will redefine emergency hedging.At the same time,it will classify emergency hedging according to different standards.Degree,and put forward corresponding perfect countermeasures.