Research On The Supervision Mechanism Of PPP Information Disclosure System In China

With the continuous advancement and deepening of supply-side structural reforms,the PPP model has once again set off a wave of application in my country.The important policies that China has promulgated continuously in recent years have gradually evolved from the original provision of social public services by the government to the joint cooperation between the government and social capital.This also highlights the distinctive features of the PPP model that are different from the traditional public law and private law.Presents the nature of the fusion of public and private law.The monitoring mechanism of the PPP model information disclosure system is an integral part of the PPP model information disclosure system,and serves as a monitoring path for the behavior of the obligatory subject in the process of information disclosure.Its completion is not only a return to the standardization of the behavior of the subject performing duties,but also the enrichment of the PPP model information disclosure system to ensure the smooth progress of the PPP model information disclosure system,but also the correction of government and social capital behaviors to the public interest.protection.Since the construction of China's PPP model information disclosure system itself is in the exploration period,at the same time,due to the inertial research thinking of system construction,it will accordingly pay more attention to the definition and clarity of basic parts such as disclosure subjects and disclosure content,and will ignore the supervision mechanism in information disclosure.This thesis takes the supervision mechanism of the PPP model information disclosure system as the research object,and discusses that the PPP model information disclosure supervision mechanism still fails to update the information disclosure main body and the lower financial department has no responsibility for the order to remedy the defective information issued by the project.Strong problems,the slackness of various information providers to provide information,and the disadvantage of low initiative to modify information.The reason for this is that the supervisory mechanism itself has defects,failures,and single deficiencies in liability regulation,and it cannot form a restraint and driving force for the obliged subject.Therefore,the solutions to these problems are given based on the existing supervision mechanism and foreign experience.The first chapter aims to elicit research objects.Through the introduction of the connotation,positioning and basis of the PPP model information disclosure system's supervision mechanism,it briefly explains what the PPP model information disclosure system's supervision mechanism is,and focuses on the analysis of the regulatory mechanism's regulatory objects.The purpose of supervision and regulation of the behavior of the subject.Finally,from the perspective of regulating the behavior of the subject,the value of the supervision mechanism in the PPP model information disclosure system is analyzed.The second chapter focuses on the performance of defects in the practice of the supervision mechanism of the PPP model information disclosure system.It is mainly divided into three sections.The first section explains from the aspects of practical cases and the publication of report data that under the role of the existing monitoring mechanism,the PPP mode information disclosure obligations still appear to be very different in the degree of disclosure of the disclosure subject,and the information provider delays or fails to provide information.Moreover,the defect information is not amended actively,and the lower-level financial departments are not strong in binding the obligations of the obligor.The second section combines the legal provisions to sort out and analyze the legal framework of the existing PPP model information disclosure system's supervision mechanism.Section 3 Comprehensive practical issues and existing regulations found that the current supervision mechanism of China's PPP model information disclosure system is not as expected due to its own defects,failures,and single liability control methods.Its supervision effectiveness is not as expected,affecting its role on the subject of information disclosure obligations.The third chapter analyzes and summarizes the experience of the organization structure of the foreign PPP model information disclosure system.The results of the construction of the supervision mechanism outside the comprehensive domain found that its supervisory mechanism's effective realization of the regulatory effectiveness of the behavior of the obligated subject is mainly due to three major factors.1.The application of a complete social supervision system complements the blind spots of government supervision,and maintains full-cycle supervision of the behavior of the obligatory subject;2.The link between budget expenditure and transparency of the subject's information continuously consolidates the timeliness of government supervision and stimulates the initiative of the obligatory subject;3.1.Extensive credit tools restrict the subject of the obligation in various fields outside the project,and strengthen the coercive force of the supervision mechanism on the information providers and openers.The fourth chapter focuses on the improvement of the PPP model information disclosure system's supervision mechanism and proposes specific improvement suggestions to maximize the effectiveness of the supervision mechanism.In view of the problem of inert laissez-faire of the obligatory subject due to internal lack of the supervision mechanism and the occurrence of blind spots in supervision,it is necessary to continuously strengthen the social supervision path from the two levels of social professional supervision and general public supervision.The former is supplemented with practical basis to make it into open information The behavior of the obligatory subject is the focus of supervision.The latter stimulates the public's enthusiasm for the supervision of the subject's behavior through institutional incentives.In view of the difficulty of the failure of the supervision mechanism due to the entanglement of interests between government departments,the introduction of government performance management measures into the supervision mechanism forms an independent mechanism of "responsibility-interest" to promote the correction of the behavior of the PPP model information disclosure subject and to be increasingly standardized to be solved.To address the issue of weakening the compulsory force of the obligor subject due to the single implementation method of responsibility,the responsibility implementation method has been expanded from the two directions of linking the responsibility method with the credit system construction and payment mechanism,and the supervision mechanism has become more binding.