Media Supervision,Board Governance And Tunneling

In recent years,tunneling has occurred frequently,the interests of investors have failed to be effectively protected,and the financial market order has been severely damaged.Therefore,how to effectively reduce the occurrence of tunneling has become a hot issue in the theoretical and practical sectors.Since La Porta et al.(1999)has found that the agency problem between the first controlling shareholder and other shareholders is particularly serious,as the scholars continue to explore,the study showed that in addition to the UK and the USA and other developed countries,most companies in most countries and regions have relatively concentrated equity.The phenomenon and the tunneling problem are relatively commoa Scholars mainly study response measures from internal and external governance mechanisms.The board occupies an indispensable position in corporate governance.Whether or not it can effectively carry out governance activities affects the development of the company and also affects the interests of investors.As an emerging external governance mechanism,the media supervision effectiveness has attracted the attention of all sectors of society.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the relationship between the governance of the board and media supervision,and the tunneling behavior.It is helpful to reduce the occurrence of tunneling and ease the agency problem between the first controlling shareholder and other shareholders.First of all,this paper sorts out the relevant research results from the three aspects of media supervision,board governance,and tunneling behavior,and then makes a brief review.Secondly,based on the six theories of principal-agent theory,property rights theory,information asymmetry theory,government regulation theory,reputation governance theory,and market pressure theory,and combined with the characteristics o.f China's capital market,this paper analyzes the tunneling behavior in detail,and then proposes seven hypotheses.This paper selects A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges as empirical sanples for 2012-2016.The results of the study indicate that:(1)Board governance helps restrict the tunneling behavior.In detail,a reasonable size of board and higher the proportion of independent directors and independent directors in different places and the separate leadership structure of the two positions will help improve the internal governance mechanism of the company and reduce the occurrence of tunneling.(2)Media supervision can help to reduce the occurrence of tunneling.Compared with non-state-owned listed companies,media supervision has a weaker inhibitory effect on the tunneling of state-owned listed companies.(3)Media supervision and board governance have substitution effects on reducing the occurrence of tunneling.Under the condition that the effectiveness of board governance is relatively bad,media supervision can effectively reduce the tunneling.Finally,based on the empirical results and research conclusions,this paper proposes some suggestions to reduce the tunneling from the perspectives of media supervision and board governance.