Pricing Strategy Study Of Bilateral Platform Considering Network Externalities

With the continuous development of the Internet,a series of network platforms have emerged.These network platforms integrate the resources of all parties through the Internet,which not only promotes their own development,but also facilitates the life and work of residents and promotes the development of economy and society.At present,many platforms on the market belong to bilateral platforms.Bilateral platforms,like intermediaries,connect users on both sides to centralize their supply and demand,thereby reducing transaction costs.The bilateral platform provides services to attract users and realize their own.Profit and development.For users on both sides of the bilateral platform,the pricing for them is generally different.The main reason is that it is affected by the externality of the network,that is,the utility obtained by the user is related to the size of the users on both sides of the platform,that is,affected by the externality of the network.Therefore,for the bilateral platform,in the process of pursuing profit maximization,how to price the bilateral users and formulate a reasonable pricing strategy is very important.Based on the typical bilateral platform of the network take-out platform,this paper analyzes how the cross-network externalities and intra-group network externalities affect the pricing of users under monopolistic conditions and competition conditions under different development stages of bilateral platforms.At the same time,what kind of pricing strategy should the bilateral platform adopt to obtain the maximum benefit? The research in this paper is based on the monopoly Armstrong model and the Hotelling competition model,combining the background of different development stages of the bilateral platform.Under the monopoly conditions,based on the analysis of the monopoly Armstrong model,in the early stage of the development of the bilateral platform,due to the weak social attributes of the bilateral platform,only the influence of the cross-network externality on the pricing of the bilateral platform is considered;the bilateral platform develops to a certain scale,and the platform service capability Under limited circumstances,as the users on both sides pay more attention to the situation on the same side,the externality of the cross-network will gradually weaken.At this time,the influence of the externality of the network within the group on the pricing of the bilateral platform will be considered.In the same way,under the competitive conditions,based on the Hotelling competition model,there are two platforms in the market,and each has a certain scale.In the early stage of the development of the bilateral platform,due to the weak social attributes of the bilateral platform,only the cross-network externalities are considered.For the impact of bilateral platform pricing,find the optimal pricing under the influence of this,analyze the impact of cross-network externalities on it,and give a reasonable pricing strategy;when the platform develops to a certain scale and the platform service capability is limited,As the users on both sides pay more attention to the situation on the same side,the externality of the crossnetwork will gradually weaken.At this time,the impact of the externality of the network within the group on the pricing of the bilateral platform will be considered,and the influence of the externality of the network within the group on the optimal pricing will be analyzed.Give a reasonable pricing strategy.Finally,through the simulation values,test the relevant conclusions of this paper.