Reseach On R&D Investment And Enterprise Value Based On The Ultimate Control Rights

Innovation is the source of enterprise technology development and an important way for enterprise progress and development.As an important link of enterprise innovation and creation,R&D investment is the key factor for enterprises to gain advantage in the market.Under the influence of 5G construction,the scale of global communication equipment industry has increased obviously,and the competitive pressure of the industry has increased,which puts forward higher requirements for the innovation ability of enterprises.Therefore,how to form high efficiency and high quality R&D investment has become the key content of scholars and enterprises.Research shows that efficient and high quality R&D inputs contribute to the output of core intangible assets of enterprises,so they have a sustained and stable R&D investment can bring long-term and high-speed development to communication equipment manufacturing enterprises,and embrace new opportunities in the new globalization,so as to achieve the goal of maximizing the value of enterprises.With the deepening of research,the influencing factors of R&D performance have also received extensive attention.In the case of the second kind of agency problem,some scholars have made research on the influence of ultimate shareholder control on R&D activities.This paper takes the ultimate shareholder control as the research angle,not only studies the influence of ultimate control rights on R&D input,but also discusses the regulating effect of supervision and decision efficiency of actual controller on the relationship between R&D input and enterprise value,which has a certain theoretical and practical significance.In this paper,by reviewing the domestic and foreign research literature,on the principal-agent theory,control theory of self-interest,and the theory of stakeholder as theoretical basis,and the regression analysis for the above theory,we will take the China's communication equipment manufacturing industry of a-share listed companies from 2015 to 2017 as samples.In the perspective of ultimate control,studying on the framework of the second agency problem,researching the ultimate controlling shareholder behavior on the relationship between R&D investment and enterprise valueadjustment.First of all,the empirical test of R&D investment on enterprise value is positive correlation,and on this basis,regression analysis of ultimate controlling shareholder's control power on R&D investment and enterprise value has a negative moderating effect;Then,the regression analysis of ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow right on R&D investment and enterprise value relationship has a positive moderating effect;Furthermore,the regression analysis of ultimate controlling shareholders of the two rights deviation degree on the R&D investment and enterprise value relationship has a negative moderating effect;Finally,regression analysis of the degree of shareholder checks and balances on the R&D investment and enterprise value relationship has a positive regulatory effect.Research findings :(1)the R&D input of listed companies in the communication equipment manufacturing industry in China will positively affect the enterprise value in the lag period,and the greater the R&D input in the current period,the better the enterprise value in the next period;(2)the control right of the ultimate controlling shareholder limits the freedom of enterprise R&D investment,and has a negative regulating effect on the relationship between R&D investment and enterprise value;(3)the cash flow power of the ultimate controlling shareholder can effectively balance the ultimate shareholder's PBC behavior and make them pay more attention to common interests,which has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between R&D investment and enterprise value;(4)the greater the deviation between the two rights of ultimate controlling shareholders,he more motivated they will be to hollow out the company for their own selfish interests,influence the investment decisions of the management,or conspire with the management to obtain short-term rich remuneration.Therefore,the degree of deviation between the two rights of ultimate controlling shareholders has a negative regulating effect on the relationship between R&D investment and enterprise value.(5)the higher the degree of equity checks and balances of other major shareholders on ultimate controlling shareholders,the better the positive regulating effect it will have on the relationship between R&D investment and enterprise value.In this study,all the five hypotheses were verified,among which hypothesis 5 was analyzed by grouping regression on the basis of hierarchical regression.Finally,this paper makes an in-depth analysis of the empirical conclusions and puts forward some suggestions.At the same time,pointing out the shortcomings of this study and the prospect of the future research direction.