| For a long time,enterprise tax problems are the focus of academic circles.The main in the study of enterprise tax will explain why the reasons for the difference,the influence factors of business tax.Scholars have studied the corporate tax avoidance from the company features?ownership structure?equity incentive and corporate governance.With the establishment of the modern enterprise,separating ownership rights from management rights,tax avoidance has become the problem of agency for enterprise,in order to avoid tax avoidance is discovered by tax authority,management conduct complicated and opaque tax avoidance activities.It also contributed to the information asymmetry of shareholders and management.So management may use power rent-seeking for self-interest.At the same time,With the development of the securities market,Institutional investors continue to grow stronger and began to play an active investor gradually,supervising the behavior of management and participating in corporate governance in more clear attitude.Institutional investors have become an effective external governance mechanism as enterprise important external stakeholders.Through literature review and theoretical analysis,Literature has Studied the relationship between CEO power and enterprise tax avoidance,but there is no literature study the relationship between CEO power and enterprise tax avoidance from the perspective of external supervisors.Practice shows that institutional investors as external stakeholders,they can play a role of the supervision of listed companies and to a certain extent affect the corporate governance decisions.Securities investment funds as the most important part of institutional investors,This paper studies the effects of CEO power and different institutional investors on the enterprise tax avoidance separately and the interaction between the three based on the principal-agent theory.This article is based on research results at home and abroad,This essay tests respectively the influence of CEO power and different institutional investors to the enterprise tax avoidance with the sample of Chinese A-share enterprises listed during the 2010-2015.The empirical results show that:(1)The greater the CEO power,the greater the intensity of enterprise tax avoidance.(2)The higher the institutional investor shareholding,the smaller the intensity of enterprise tax avoidance.(3)The higher the Securities investment funds shareholding,the greater the intensity of enterprise tax avoidance.(4)The higher the other major investment institutions shareholding,the smaller the intensity of enterprise tax avoidance.(5)Institutional investors can effectively restrain the CEO power,thus,institutional investors holding can weaken the positive correlation between CEO power and the intensity of enterprise tax avoidance.(6)the securities investment funds can't restrain the CEO power,thus,the Securities investment funds holding can't weaken the positive correlation between CEO power and the intensity of enterprise tax avoidance.(7)the other major investment institutions can restrain the CEO power partly,thus,the other major investment institutions holding can weaken the positive correlation between CEO power and the intensity of enterprise tax avoidance partly.In this paper,the research conclusion can provide beneficial reference and evidence for tax collection and administration work and the improvement of the supervision mechanism.For tax collection and administration department,The research conclusion of this essay provides a new perspective to how to restrain enterprises tax avoidance behavior?to reduce the difficulty of tax collection and to improve the efficiency of tax collection and administration.For corporate governance,Institutional investors can effectively inhibit the CEO's self-interest behavior,it extends the institutional investors play a role in supervision and management as external stakeholders,thereby reducing the principal-agent costs and ensuring CEO make tax evasion decision. |
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