Choice Of Equity Incentive Tools,Executive Characteristics And Cash Dividend Policy

As of the end of 2015,China's listed companies announced a total of 909 equity incentive plans.The tools in these incentive plans can be broadly divided into:stock options,restricted stocks and stock appreciation rights.Early stock options accounted for about 70%,followed by restricted shares.However,there have been a large number of listed companies implementing restrictive stocks since 2013.In order to guide and regulate the implementation of equity incentive,the SFC amended and promulgated the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentives for Listed Companies in 2016.In addition,the Commission issued a notice in 2015 to require listed companies to establish a sound cash dividend system to encourage corporate dividends.Therefore,based on the special institutional background of China's protected equity incentive,this paper explores how the impact of the choice of equity incentive tools on cash dividend policy?Executives as the.protagonist of equity incentives,but also involved in dividend distribution decisions,executive characteristics whether and how to adjust the relationship between the above two?How to promote the optimal design of executive equity incentive contract,so that the utility function of the agent and the objective function of the client are unified to maximize the enterprise value?These issues are worthy of attention.Based on this,this paper selected 2006-2015 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as research samples.First of all,this paper reviews the research on the correlation between equity incentive and cash dividend policy,the correlation between executive characteristics and cash dividend policy and the moderating effect of executive characteristics.Secondly,with principal-agent,information asymmetry dividend agency cost,"bird in hand" and customer effect theory,this paper analyzes the relationship between the choice of equity incentive tools and the cash dividend policy.Based on the contingency theory and the high-level echelon theory,it discusses the moderating effect of the executive characteristics on the above two.Again,the empirical analysis of the relationship between the choice of equity incentive tool and cash dividend policy(dividend intention,level,continuity and stability),and analyzed the moderating effect of the executive characteristics by hierarchical regression,then distinguishing the type of moderator,drawing the moderating effect.Finally,make recommendations according to the conclusions.The empirical results show that:(1)Under the background of the dividend protection clause,the companies that implement the restricted shares are more willing to pay the cash dividends,pay higher and have better dividends than the stock options;(2)The choice of equity incentive tools has no significant effect on the stability of the payment rate of the dividends of the listed companies;(3)Executive age positively moderating the relationship between the choice of equity incentive tools and the cash dividend policy,that is,the corporate which use of restricted stock has higher cash dividend payout rate than the corporate use of stock options,and this difference when the executives are older,they are enriched;(4)Executive education negatively moderating the strength of the relationship between the choice of equity incentive tools and the cash dividend policy,that is,the corporate which use of restricted stock has higher cash dividend payout rate than the corporate use of stock options,but this difference when the executives has higher education,they are weakened;(5)Executive cash pay is significantly positively correlated with cash dividends,and the impact is more significant in State-owned enterprises,but it is not a moderator.Based on the above research results,this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to the stakeholders in improving the internal governance structure,strengthening the incentive of the senior executives and improving the matching laws and regulations.