The Influence Of Official Independent Directors On Earnings Management And Corporate Financing:

The phenomenon of part-time or receiving subsidies for current or retired officials in the enterprise is widespread.As the official independent directors mastere the advantages of resources,some part-time officials have used non-normal means to interfere in business operations,which has intensified social inequalities,disrupted the market economy,and destroyed the Party and the country.The image leads to the lack of public trust.In order to strengthen cadre management and combat corruption,the Central Organization Department promulgated the "Opinions on Further Regulating Party and Government Leading Cadres' Part-time(Job-in-Vesting)Issues" to impose more stringent legal restrictions on officials' appointments in enterprises.The document clearly stipulates that party and government current leading cadres are not allowed to work part-time in the company.Even if retired party and government leading cadres go to the company for part-time work,they must also be strict.controlled.After the publication of the document,a large number of official independent directors resigned.In less than two years after the document was issued,1,413 independent directors resigned.As to what role the independent directors play in the enterprise,the resignation of independent directors caused by the issuance of Document No.18 deserves a thorough investigation into how to influence earnings management and corporate financing.This article takes resignations of independent directors in China's capital market from 2012 to 2015 as the research samples,and combs the current research on independent directors,independent directors and earnings management,independent directors and corporate financing.Based on asymmetric information theory,principal-agent theory,resource dependence theory,and weak-linked advantage theory,the influence of official independent directors on earnings management and corporate financing is analyzed,and the research hypothesis of the paper is proposed.By constructing a multiple regression model for empirical testing,the paper draws the following conclusions:First,the level of earnings management of listed companies with official independent directors is higher than that of listed companies without official independent directors.Second,the level of earnings management of listed companies with resignations of independent directors of the officials was lower than that of listed companies without resignations of independent directors.Third,corporate finance of listed companies with official independent directors is significantly higher than that of listed companies without official independent directors.Fourth,compared with listed companies that do not have the resignations of official independent directors,there is a significant reduction in corporate financing for listed companies with official independent directors who resigned.According to the empirical results,the paper proposes the following suggestions::We can improve the selection and employment of independent directors,formulate a strict normative evaluation system,and marketize the appointment system for independent directors.Second,the financial market of our country should establish a strict restraint mechanism for independent directors,and pursue administrative,civil,and criminal liabilities for the adverse consequences of their dereliction of duty.Thirdly,it is proposed to set up an organization for its daily management and service,formulate behavioral standards and various standards,and define the rights and obligations of independent directors.