Top Management Team's Remuneration Differences,Ownership Concentration And Quality Of Internal Control

In the past ten years,the failure of listed companies and the occurrence of financial fraud have caused the concern of regulators,corporations and academics about the internal control of listed companies.With the implementation of the basic norms and supporting guidelines of internal control of our country,the internal control system of listed companies in our country is more and more perfect,and the system of information disclosure is also more and more perfect.The construction of internal control of listed companies has received unprecedented attention.The top management team plays a key role in the construction of internal control.Its team composition also influences the communication of the whole team,the psychological state of the team members and the work efficiency of the team as a whole.Moreover,the internal organizational situation in the executive team also has a profound impact on the senior management team's decision-making,process and distribution of rights,and then has a profound impact on the internal control of listed companies.In this paper,the data of listed companies in our country from 2012 to 2016 are taken as the research object,and the empirical test is made on the relationship among the remuneration differences of top management team,the ownership concentration and the quality of internal control of listed companies.Descriptive statistics,correlation analysis and regression analysis of the data.First of all,the research shows that there is a significant negative correlation between the remuneration difference of the top management team and the quality of the internal control.That is,the quality of the internal control of the listed company declines significantly as the remuneration difference of the top management team increases.The result shows that the salary difference of senior executives in listed companies will bring unfairness to team members,which leads to the decrease of team efficiency and the psychology of team members seeking compensation,resulting in the decline of internal control quality.Secondly,it examines the regulatory effect of ownership concentration and finds that ownership concentration has an inhibitory effect on the impact of executive compensation on the quality of internal control.Compared to companies with high concentration of ownership,the remuneration differences among top management team in the listed companies with low ownership concentration has a more significant effect on the quality of internal control.The paper also verifies the results of the model by substituting the proxy variables of internal control quality and remuneration differences.These robustness tests are consistent with the results of the main test and support the conclusions of this study.