Holding Shareholders Equity Pledge Financing,Equity Characteristics And Listed Company Value

Equity pledge is a kind of pledge of rights.It refers to a kind of behavior that shareholders use the shares held by them as the subject matter to pledge and obtain funds from financial institutions or individuals such as banks and securities companies.With the continuous update and improvement of the financial services industry,equity pledges,as an innovative financial product,has transformed the economic stocks into economic flows,ensuring adequate cash flow and providing a more convenient channel for corporate financing.So it is favored by the capital market and the phenomenon that the controlling shareholders use equity pledge to absorb funds has also increased.However,with the increase in the number of shares pledged,the related risks caused by it also emerged.In recent years,the stock prices of a number of listed companies have fallen below the margin line set up by the controlling shareholders equity pledge.The controlling shareholders have been caught in many debt disputes.The capital chain has been broken.The risk of default has increased dramatically,and the interests of investors have been seriously damaged.Therefore,the study on equity pledge of controlling shareholders is particularly important.From the perspective of control rights transfer risk,this article combines the shareholding characteristics of controlling shareholders such as the nature of equity,equity restriction,etc.,discusses the behaviors of the controlling shareholders and their impact on the listed companies,and uses capital market related data to analyze the impact of controlling shareholders equity pledge on the value of listed companies.By sorting out the relevant literature,we can find that whether the research object is the direct role of the external management mechanism or the indirect role of the internal correlation mechanism,the studies on the role of controlling shareholder are generally based on the "governance" status and take governance factor as the connecting bridges between controlling shareholders and listed companies.However,the dual nature of the controlling shareholder determines that in addition to the"governance" status,there is also an "operator" identity as an independent legal entity.The "operator" identity of controlling shareholders may directly or indirectly affect the value of the listed company through its own management decisions,financial decisions,and investment decisions.Obviously,from the perspective of "operator" identity,there is not much research about the influence of the controlling shareholder's own behavior on listed companies.Therefore,based on the "operator" identity of controlling shareholder,we follows the research thought which regards controlling shareholder's own behavior as the conduction factor.Based on principal-agent theory and control rights theory,this paper starts with a large sample of empirical analysis and focuses on the impact of the financial behaviors of controlling shareholders on the listed companies.Then,ths artical multi-levelly verifies the effect of equity pledge financing of controlling shareholders on the value of listed companies.This article's expectation is to verify the hypothesis proposed through empirical research methods:(1)The financing behavior of the holding shareholder's equity pledge will lead to the decrease of the value of the listed company;(2)Compared with state-owned listed companies,the negative impact of equity pledge by controlling shareholders on the value of the company is even more pronounced in private listed companies;(3)The higher equity balance degree is,the lower negative influence of equity pledge of controlling shareholders on corporate value becomes.According to the hypothetical verification situation,we draw the conclusion that in the capital market,whether the equity pledge of controlling shareholders will lead to a decline in the value of the company.The results of the study can not only supplement the inadequacies of the existing literature,but can also guide the small and medium-sized investors,who are vulnerable and weak-minded,to further protect their own interests from the infringement of controlling shareholders at the practical level.