Study On Information Transparency,Institutional Investors And Stock Price Synchronicity

As a criterion for judging the efficiency of the capital market,research on stock price synchronicity has been focused by scholars at domestic and foreign.However,the debate on whether low stock price synchronicity represents the integration of information at the company level or noise interference has been stubbornly inconsistent.Although China's capital market has made great strides in infrastructure and supporting systems after nearly 30 years of rapid development,the dual nature of the emerging plus transition has not fundamentally changed,with obvious non-effectiveness and irrational characteristics.For Chinese SME board market,the above characteristics are more obvious.The information transparency of listed companies is poorer,and the issue of information asymmetry becomes more prominent;on the other hand,the SME board market has long been favored by retail investors,causing the market to be filled with a lot of noise,which seriously interferes with the effectiveness of company-level information integration into stock prices.So,what is the reason for the decrease of the stock price synchronicity of the SME board market? Is it due to the integration of the company's characteristic information or the interference of noise? As a relatively rational investor,institutional investors have stronger motives and capabilities in mining company-specific information and participating in corporate governance,which can effectively promote timely and effective delivery of company information.This point of view has already been tested in the mature capital market and China's main board.However,in the SME board market,whether institutional investors can improve the efficiency of capital market information still needs further study.Through the research on the above issues,this paper hopes to provide practical and feasible ways to improve the efficiency of information and achieve more efficient capital allocation in the SME board market.After combing the literature of information transparency,institutional investor and stock price synchronicity,based on effective market theory,information asymmetry theory,signaling theory and behavioral finance theory,this paper puts forward the core hypothesis in combination with the unique information environment of China's SME board market,and taking the listed companies from 2010 to 2015 in the SME board market as the research object,empirically examines the correlation between information transparency and stock price synchronicity and the regulatory role of institutional investors in the relationship between the two.The results show that the transparency of the listed company's information is positively correlated with the stock price synchronization.That is,in China's SME board market,the synchronization of stock prices positively reflects the information efficiency of capital market;what's more,institutional investors' shareholdings cannot significantly weaken the former two's deformities.There are some differences between this finding and the existing research conclusions of the main board market,but this phenomenon can be better explained by the heterogeneity of institutional investors.As pressure-resistant institutional investors maintain commercial independence with the investee companies,their shareholdings have an active mediation effect on the correlation between information transparency and stock price synchronization;while pressure-sensitive institutional investors can't release positive energy,and even increase the possibility of positive correlation between the two.Based on the research conclusions,this paper believes that it is possible to improve the information efficiency of the SME board market by means of source governance,intermediary grooming and multi-party cooperation.First of all,improving the efficiency of capital market information requires fundamentally improving the transparency of corporate information and purifying the information environment.Secondly,conduct differentiated management of institutional investors: on the one hand,lead pressure-resilient institutional investors to continue adhering to the positive concept of value investment;on the other hand,closely monitors the business transactions between pressure-sensitive investors and invested companies,to suppress possible negative influences in the bud,and seek advantages and avoid disadvantages.Finally,actively guide investors to develop good investment habits,as well as improve the overall professional quality of investors to reduce the possibility of noise formation and effects from the perspective of information receivers.