Research On The Relationship Between Ownership Concentration,agency Cost And Enterprise Performance

Modern corporate governance mechanism has a great impact on the value and performance of enterprises.Establishing a sound corporate governance mechanism is one of the core contents of modern company system,and it is an important way to improve the quality of Listed Companies in China.The ownership structure is the main component of the corporate governance.The different ownership structure will promote the enterprise to form different governance mechanisms and corporate governance effects,have different influence on the enterprise performance level,and the ownership concentration can directly reflect the type of the equity structure of the enterprises.The modern enterprise also showed an important feature is the separation of the two powers,the appearance of the principal-agent relationship in order to improve the enterprise specialized economy and reduce business risk,but the cost is too high,and the impact of the allocation of resources,resulting in a waste of resources,damage the interests of the stakeholders.Therefore,it studies the ownership concentration and the agency problem,and explores how the ownership concentration affects the performance of the enterprise.Whether the agency cost plays an intermediary role in this process,it can provide some ideas for the listed companies to improve the corporate governance and improve the quality of the listed companies.A review of the literature of many scholars is the relationship between ownership structure,agency cost and corporate performance,based on the above analysis,this paper selects the A listed company in China as the research object,select the data from2012 to 2016 as the panel data,put three variables into the research framework.On the basis of theoretical research,through the empirical research method of multivariate statistical regression analysis,this paper analyzes the relationship between ownership concentration and agency cost and enterprise performance,and probes into the intermediary role of agency cost between ownership concentration and firm performance.The conclusions are as follows:(1)There is an inverted U relationship between the ownership concentration and the enterprise performance in the sample enterprise,and the moderate equity concentration can improve the enterprise performance;(2)The correlation analysis showed that there is a positive U relationship between ownershipconcentration and the first agency cost,which has a negative impact on the second types of agency costs.(3)The two category agency cost is partly mediated by ownership concentration and firm performance.According to the empirical results and conclusions,put forward some countermeasures and suggestions:(1)the enterprises should maintain a moderate degree of ownership concentration,and cultivate more rational shareholders with control power.(2)establish and improve a scientific and unified internal and external supervision mechanism to effectively control agency costs:strengthen the internal supervision mechanism of the company,improve the independent director system;improve the market for professional managers;establish an effective external supervision mechanism and improve the information disclosure system.