Empirical Study On The Relationship Between Associated Accounting Expertise Independent Directors?Management Power And Company Over-investment

The board of directors which help company making business decision play the irreplaceable role in corporate governance,As the main part of corporate governance structure,the independent director system play an important role as well,In order to solve agency conflict and the interest of the medium and small investors.However,due to the controlling shareholder and management to grasp the initiative,It plays a decisive role in the selection of independent directors,As a result,the independence of independent directors is relatively lacking,which affects the effective governance of independent directors.Many previous studies have proved that independent directors cannot maintain independence in actual corporate governance,It didn't play a supervisory role,Therefore,it is necessary to study how independent directors maintain their independence for the effective play of their governance role.Domestic and foreign researches on the incentive methods of independent directors can be generally summarized into the perspectives of salary,law,market and reputation.In reality,not every one of them can be effective incentives,From a salary perspective,by convention,The remuneration of the independent directors of each company is agreed in advance and fixed every year;From a legal perspective,China's capital market transformation has not been completed,There are no standard and perfect statutory provisions to restrict the behavior of independent directors;From the perspective of the market,China's labor market is in an imperfect competition market,It is not effective to manage the appointment and dismissal of independent directors in a reasonable and standard way.Therefore,none of the first three perspectives can effectively motivate independent directors.From the perspective of reputation,it is more beneficial to study how to effectively supervise independent directors and motivate them to play a governance role.The reputation mechanism influences the role of independent directors,which is reflected in that the low reputation level will lead to the reduction of seats available to independent directors.It will affect the appointment of the independent director and reduce the trust of the independent director;A good professional reputation increases its bargaining power in the market and has positive incentive effect.A high professional reputation indicates that the independent director is competent,diligent and responsible,and will pay a greater price if his reputation is damaged.In addition,many previous studies have confirmed that independent directors with professional accounting background can better playtheir governance role.To sum up,this paper chooses the reputation of the independent director of accounting major as the entry point and analyzes the specific influence on the investment behavior of the company.This paper attempts to explore the impact of the reputation of independent directors in accounting profession on excessive investment,In addition,regional characteristics of independent directors,management power and other factors are further added,Local and long-distance high reputation of the accounting professional independent directors differences about the existence of excessive investment inhibitory effect will weaken the high reputation and management power accounting the governance effect of independent director,to enrich and expand the independent director and company investment related literature.This paper takes China's a-share non-financial listed companies as research samples from 2007 to 2015,and draws the following conclusions:(1)The higher accounting professional background of independent directors reputation,the company's excessive investment behavior is less,accounting independent directors reputation and excessive investment level change,reverse and high reputation of the accounting professional independent directors are,the higher the proportion of independent directors,excessive investment level is lower.(2)Compared with independent directors with high reputation accounting majors in other places,independent directors with high reputation accounting majors in local areas have a better effect on restraining excessive investment in the company.(3)The power of management will weaken the inhibiting effect of high reputation independent accounting directors on excessive investment.This paper consists of six parts,taking the reasons for selecting the topic,putting forward the hypothesis and verifying the hypothesis as the logical thinking:The opening part is an introduction.The introduction mainly includes the research background and practical significance of the reputation of independent directors and the excessive investment of the company,At the same time,it also summarizes the general ideas and writing methods of this paper,The display is more intuitive by means of frame diagram.The literature review is the second part.Through reading of classic literature,summarized the domestic scholars and foreign scholars think that the cause of excessive investment,independent director in the research,the role of the accounting major of independent directors and accounting governance effect research of the independent directors,independent director's reputation mechanism research,theindependent director governance research with excessive investment in the company of literature research and all kinds of views,and summarizes the classification,extraction,based on this,advances the main points in this paper.The third part is the basic theory of this paper,Introduces the accounting professional reputation of the independent directors,excessive investment relationship management power and the company's basic theory,the connotation of independent director's reputation and the influencing factors of excessive investment by details.The fourth part puts forward the hypothesis and analysis of the relationship between the reputation of independent directors,the power of management and the overinvestment of the company.In sum up,on the basis of basic theory,theoretically deeper analysis whether the reputation of the accounting independent directors discretion and whether there is influence between different characteristics of excessive investment,and the research hypothesis.The fifth part of the main content is through data collection,sample selection,variable and model building,the definition of the accounting professional reputation of the independent directors,the management power: an empirical study of excessive investment relationship with the company.Through stata12.0,using the model and the data,descriptive statistics,correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis proved that the research hypothesis,this paper obtained the related conclusion which is a key content of this article.The sixth part is the analysis and induction of the above theoretical research and empirical research institute of forms and conclusion,the research summarized the shortcoming of this article and looking forward to the future research direction,meanwhile it provides the suggestions correspond to this article.The contribution of this paper are mainly:(1)the existing study of independent director and the excessive investment mainly focused on discussing the proportion of independent directors or personal characteristics and excessive investment,There is little literature on the relationship between reputation and overinvestment of independent directors from the perspective of reputation of independent directors,In addition,the previous studies seldom involved the relationship between accounting professional independent directors and excessive investment.Therefore,this paper attempts to explore the impact of the reputation of independent directors in accounting profession on excessive investment.In addition,this paper also adds regional characteristics of independent directors,To investigate whether there is any differencein the inhibitory effect of independent directors of high reputation accounting profession on excessive investment in local and foreign countries,Enriched and expanded the independent director and company investment related literature;(2)This paper investigates whether management power will affect the inhibiting effect of independent directors of high reputation accounting profession on excessive investment and enriches the literature of management power,(3)This paper explores the effect of high reputation accounting professional independent directors in board governance,which provides certain reference value for the selection and appointment of independent directors of China's listed companies.