Research On The Relationship Between Abnormal Audit Fees And Audit Opinion Under The Supervision Of Media

Since the beginning of the 21 st century,the accounting firms and the auditees have repeatedly tried to achieve collusion through various means.In the United States,Enron and World Com were all ruined by financial fraud.In our country,Yin Guang Xia which has been praised as "China's first blue chip stock" was collapsed because of the exposure by Finance Magazine.Then,"the old blue chips" Lam Tin shares were exposed by Liu Shuwei in a magazine.In many cases,auditors are often the "accomplices" of fraud,and whether auditors are losing their independence due to economic temptations is a problem to be studied.At the same time,these financial fraud and auditing collusion scandals such as Enron,Yin Guang Xia and Lam Tin were all due to the financial media reports that caused the attention of regulators,investors and other stakeholders.These show that the media play an important role.In order to regulate the audit market,the regulator has also issued a series of policies to strengthen the regulation.Especially in 2017,though the huge fines of Shine Wing Certified Accountants we can see the determination of the regulators to fix the market.Will auditors give false audit opinions because of economic temptations? Does the type of audit opinion received by the company affect the above relationship? What role does media supervision play?In order to answer these questions,this paper takes 2009-2016 in Shanghai and Shenzhen main board listed companies as the research object,respectively discussing the relationship between the abnormal audit fees and audit opinion,as well as the previous audit opinion type on the impact of this relationship.At the same time,combining the theory of agenda-setting we divide media supervision into two dimensions to explore the moderating effect.The results show that the higher the abnormal audit fee is,the more likely it is to issue the non-standard audit opinion.In distinguishing the previous audit opinion type,if the auditee has been issued a "non-standard" audit opinion in the previous year,the higher the audit fee is,the less likely it will be to issue the "non-standard" audit opinion.Audit opinion purchase success.This paper speculates that this is due to the strong motivation of the auditee to avoid negative opinions again,which will give the auditor greater pressure and economic incentives,making the auditor's independence finally shaken.In the end,this paper divides the media supervision into two dimensions: the number of media negative evaluations and the degree of media attention,which are included as moderating variables into the first two hypotheses.Finally it is concluded that,the media supervision will further strengthen the auditor's own determination to issue "non-standard" audit opinions,and when media attention is high,it will obviously inhibit the collusion between the firm and the auditee.This paper expands the existing research results,and based on the empirical results,proposes corresponding policy recommendations from the perspective of audit supervisors,demanders and suppliers.