A Study On The Relationship Between Ownership Structure And Earnings Quality

In recent years,the earnings quality of listed companies has attracted much attention.The earnings quality is not only a research hotspot in academic fields,but also a focal point of management practice.The financial fraud cases such as the Enron Incident,Wanfushengke and Toshiba's seven consecutive frauds severely undermined investor confidence in the capital market,leaving investors with doubts about the earnings quality disclosed by listed companies.These financial fraud cases often hide the flaws in corporate governance.This article is based on the property rights foundation of corporate governance,and studies the relationship between ownership structure and earnings quality trying to provide some suggestions for improving the earnings quality of listed companies.This article first systematically reviews the domestic and foreign literature on ownership structure,earnings quality of listed companies and the relationship between the two.Secondly,in order to discuss the relationship between ownership structure and earnings quality,this article puts forward research hypotheses and analyses the relationship between earnings quality and ownership concentration,ownership nature,management shareholdings,institutional shareholdings and types of institutional investors combining Agency Theory,Corporate Governance Theory,Prospect Theory and Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs.Then this article takes the data of Chinese small and medium-sized boards of listed companies from 2012 to 2016 as a research sample,and using Stata statistical analysis software makes empirical analysis.Finally,this article puts forward some suggestions based on the conclusion of the article,and sums up the deficiencies of the article and the future research prospects.The conclusions of this study indicate that the more concentrated the equity ownership is,the more serious the “short selling” phenomenon of major shareholders,which leads to the lower earnings quality of listed companies;the earnings quality disclosed by non-government-controlled listed companies is higher than that of government-controlledlisted companies;the increase in management shareholdings can promote the improvement of earnings quality;the higher overall shareholding ratio of institutional investors is always concerned with the lower earnings quality;the level of earnings quality of listed companies are also different among different enterprises that has different types of institutional investors;and the relationship between pressure-sensitive institutional investors' shareholding ratio and earnings quality is relatively weak;while the shareholding ratio of pressure-resistant is negatively correlated with earnings quality when the ratio is relatively low.