Study On Risk Taking Of Commercial Banks Under Regulation Of Liquidity Risk

After the financial crisis broke out in 2007,many commercial banks with perfect risk management system and sufficient capital level fell into trouble or even close to collapse because of the depletion of liquidity level.The global banking sector and even the real economy have been hit hard.The crisis has exposed flaws in the liquidity risk management system of global commercial banks.International financial regulatory institutions and financial regulatory authorities of various countries immediately began to promote the reform of the supervision of liquidity risk of commercial banks.China's regulatory authorities have also continued to improve the regulatory system of liquidity risks of commercial banks.In order to improve the liquidity level of commercial banks through more stringent liquidity risk supervision,we should formulate the standards of liquidity risk supervision in line with the national conditions of our country.But whether more strict supervision of liquidity risk can positively improve the liquidity level of commercial banks and effectively restrict the risk bearing of banks needs further study.This paper systematically studies the influence of liquidity supervision constraints on the risk taking of commercial banks.Firstly,it expounds the relevant theories of liquidity risk supervision of commercial banks.Then,it defines the concept of risk taking of commercial banks.From the three dimensions of asset allocation risk taking,liability selection risk taking and risk taking consequences,the research framework of commercial bank risk taking is established.On this basis liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratio,the paper analyzes the influence mechanism of liquidity risk supervision constraint on commercial banks' risk taking.Secondly,it combs the practice of liquidity risk supervision in China,and analyzes the current situation of liquidity risk and risk taking of commercial banks in China.A simultaneous equation model is constructed to test the relationship between liquidity level and risk taking of commercial banks under liquidity risk regulatory constraints.The results show that the liquidity risk regulatory constraints are formed by the liquidity ratio as a regulatory index.The liquidity level of commercial banks does not play a substantial role in improving the liquidity level of commercial banks,and it will encourage commercial banks to bear risks.The specific relationship needs to be discussed on a case-by-case basis.It is worth noting that the improvement of liquidity coverage and net stable financing ratio can effectively inhibit the risk bearing of commercial banks.In view of the risk supervision system of commercial banks in China,this paper puts forward three policy suggestions: first,to perfect the liquidity risk supervision system;second,to supervise the liquidity risk of commercial banks guided by risk-bearing;thirdly,to improve the liquidity risk supervision of commercial banks.Strengthen the supervision on the risk behavior of commercial banks.The innovations of this paper are as follows: first,by establishing the simultaneous equation model,the regulation standard of liquidity ratio is introduced into the model as a substitute variable of the constraint pressure of liquidity supervision.This paper studies the influence of liquidity regulatory constraints on the liquidity level and risk-taking of banks,and discusses the applicability of liquidity ratio in the liquidity risk supervision system of commercial banks in China according to the empirical results.Second,The empirical model of this paper selects liquidity ratio,current asset ratio,deposit level,liquidity gap ratio,liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratio to represent different liquidity levels of commercial banks.Non-deposit debt ratio and Z index measure the risk taking of commercial banks.The multi-dimensional analysis of the relationship between bank liquidity level and risk bearing can provide some thoughts for the risk management of commercial banks.