The Impact Of Government Quality,the Ultimate Ownership Structure On The Risk-taking Of Enterprises

China is in a period of change in the economic transition,and the government's role in the historical stage has also evolved.Because the company is born within the system environment provided by the government,the quality of the government,that is,its own administrative efficiency,corruption,fairness and fairness,and legal norms,will have a significant impact on the company's investment decisions.Due to geographical factors and problems left over by history,there are significant differences in government efficiency in various regions.Under the dual drive of economic interests and political motives,government officials often resort to support or plunder to intervene in different degrees in local companies,which means that the quality of the government will give the company a different investment environment.A certain degree of efficient government service guarantees a good institutional environment.A high-quality government manifests itself in the efficient functioning of government functions and the creation of a favorable investment environment.Enterprises will make full use of investment opportunities and choose more high-risk and high-yield investment projects,which can promote their long-term social and economic development,but due to the incompleteness of China's financial system,financial market,and inadequate property rights protection system.State-owned enterprises have undergone abnormal development in the context of government intervention,while private enterprises have not received asylum from the government and have been treated unfairly in the process of social resource allocation.Based on the special development environment of China's capital market,pyramid-type managers' shareholding structure is common in Chinese enterprises.Therefore,this paper is based on the realistic background of the significant regional differences in the local government in China.It focuses on the principal-agent problem between the ultimate controlling shareholders and the small and medium-sized shareholders.The theory deduce the internal quality among the government,the ultimate ownership structure and the enterprise risk-taking.relationship.This paper takes the data of the 2012-2016 data of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as a research sample,and uses a combination of theoretical analysis and empirical research.During the research,this article first summarizes relevant domestic and foreign literature,and analyzes the internal relationship between government quality,ultimate owner structure,and corporate risk-taking from a theoretical perspective,and the impact of the first two elements on corporate risk-taking.Based on this assumption,relevant statistical methods are used to conduct descriptive statistics and correlation analysis.The results show that:(1)There is a positive correlation between government quality and corporate risk exposure.Corporate risk assumptions increase with the quality of the government in which the company is located;(2)Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises have lower risk exposure;(3)Ultimate ownership of corporate controlling shareholders is negatively correlated with corporate risk taking.That is,the smaller the ultimate ownership,the higher the risk exposure of the company;(4)The greater the difference between the control rights and the ownership of the controlling shareholders of the company,the greater the risk exposure of the company;(5)As the quality of the government increases,the state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises The difference in risk commitment gradually decreases;(6)The higher the government quality,the lower the negative correlation between ultimate ownership and corporate risk exposure;(7)The higher the government quality,the less positive the correlation between the separation of two rights and corporate risk exposure.relationship.At the end of this paper,based on the above conclusions,we put forward policy recommendations in a targeted manner and elaborated on the limitations of this study.It is hoped that the research results of this paper can provide references for improving the quality of local governments in China and the reform of state-owned enterprises.