The Impact Of Different Property Rights To The Motivation And Validity Of Incentive

Equity incentives play a very important role in coordinating the interests of shareholders and management,promoting the company's long-term performance improvement,and attracting and retaining core talents.As a remuneration system arrangement to solve the principal-agent problem,the equity incentive has been widely used in the world and has successful cases in Europe,the United States and other countries,and has provided the impetus for the long-term development of the company.At present,equity incentives in China are still in a new and developing stage.Both are in good shape and there are some problems and risks in the process of exploration.This article analyzes the three equity incentive plans under different ownership backgrounds between Shanghai Jahwa from 2007 to 2016,and vertically compares the changes in the effectiveness of equity incentives in a state-owned and private-owned context.I hope to explore the nature of property rights through this case.Impact on the effectiveness of equity incentives.This article adopts case analysis method,literature research method,comparative analysis method and other research methods.Through sorting out and reviewing previous equity incentives of Shanghai Jahwa,the specific terms of equity incentives at different stages were compared and analyzed in detail.It was found that in the era of state-owned enterprises,Shanghai Jahwa's equity incentives have a strong welfare color,the introduction of plans lags behind,and the exercise of rights provisions Unscientific,the scope of incentives is also mainly confined to the core management.After the introduction of the plan,it was not welcomed by the market.The cumulative excess return rate was negative.At the same time,the outstanding performance of the equity incentive requirements for the year was abnormal,but it was doubtful whether Performance manipulation is suspected.In general,this time equity incentives are more like the compensation arrangements that management has made in order to obtain benefits,and have not achieved the original intention of “incentivization”.With the completion of Jahwa's restructuring in Shanghai,the managers of Huahua and the original state-owned enterprises left the company.The shareholders' intervention in the company and the equity incentive plan was stronger.After detailed analysis and comparison with previous plans,it was found that the latter two equity incentives The implementation of the conditions for the implementation of the plan is more scientific and covers a wider range of areas.In terms of motivation,it shows a relatively strong incentive.From the results,it also has a clear boosting effect on the performance of the company and the stock price.Through the research of Shanghai Jahwa's case,it is found that in the context of different property rights,equity incentives are characterized by their programs,motivations,difficulties encountered,and problems that are different.For the company itself,equity incentives are undoubtedly a kind of The excellent institutional arrangements for reconciling interests between owners and management,but how to make such arrangements not manipulated,really play a role,so that both parties benefit from each other,need to enhance the internal governance of the company and strengthen the external market constraints.The supervisory department should treat these two companies with different property rights in equity incentives differently,and should have different regulatory ideas and policy settings.At the end of this paper,it also proposes how to send two kinds of enterprises to implement equity incentives.Corresponding internal governance and external regulatory recommendations.From an academic point of view,this paper provides evidence for the different performance of equity incentives for companies with different property rights.When conducting equity incentive theories and empirical research,it will be a better choice to discuss the two separately.Although Shanghai Jahwa's equity incentive is a case,it reflects to a certain extent the different characteristics of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in equity incentives,hoping to provide reference for future theoretical research and market practice.Of course,the generalizability and generality of the research conclusions still need to be proved by more empirical studies in the future.