Earnings Management And Enterprises Investment Efficiency Analysis In The Context Of State-owned Enterprises Reform

Reform of SOEs is the main thread running through China's reform and opening as well as is the miniature of China's economic reform.With ST companies,listed financial and insurance companies excluded from the database,the remaining financial data and Enterprise nature data from year 2009 to year 2014,according to nature of the final control people divided for SOEs and private ones,used amended Jones model measure the degree of earnings management,used Richardson model measure investment efficiency level,and on the basis of further tries to analyze the effect of earnings management on the investment efficiency,found that:firstly,the earnings management level of state-owned enterprises is higher than the that of private enterprises in general.And the degree of earnings management of the state-owned enterprise overall volatility is greater than that of private enterprises.The both are biased towards the high earnings management.Secondly,the non-efficiency investment level of state-owned enterprises is lower than that of private enterprises in general.However,the non-efficiency investment categories of the two subsample are different,the former tends to overinvestment while the latter tends to underinvestment.Thirdly,the higher degree of earnings management can reduce the investment efficiency only when the separation degree of decision-making power and decision control is low(this relationship is only verified in the state-owned enterprises subsample),which is to say,the chairman is the general manager at the same time.The impact of board size on investment efficiency is not obvious.But the level of investment efficiency will be affected by more independent directors.The research of this paper is a beneficial attempt as to the existing study of internal economic consequences comes from earnings management,and by distinguish the different ultimate controller properties,which can provide some beneficial thinking for the reform of state-owned enterprises.In China,no matter of state-owned or private ones,the government should supervise and urge further improvement and changes of its governance mechanism,especially companies with the low separation degree of decision-making and decision-making.For investors,companies with high separation of decision-making power and decision-making control can be selected as investment if the quality of accounting information is high.For enterprises,especially SOEs,improving the separation degree of powers or improving the quality of accounting information can improve the efficiency of enterprise investment.