Research On The Risk Of The Listed Commercial Banks' Liability Structure In China

In the 2008-2010 financial crisis and the European debt crisis,many banks in the US and Europe,which rely on non deposit financing,have been exposed to great risks.However,after the financial crisis,the liability structure of commercial banks in China changes gradually.How changes in liability structure would affect risk levels of banks?Research on this can help banks to examine their own debt financing strategies and prevent and control risks ahead.Firstly,16 listed banks are used as subjects in this paper.Their debts are divided into deposit debts and non-deposit debts so that their structures and variation trends can be analyzed accordingly.Since 2012,main changes of liability structure of banks in China are easy to conclude.The increase rates of their total debts are slowing down continually.The deposit proportion of small and medium-sized banks is increasing.Current deposit is shrinking at an accelerated rate.Individual deposit and corporate deposit remains stable.Under the effect of regulation,the increase rate of interbank borrowings is slowing down.With a sharp rise of interbank deposit,the proportion of bond payable arises,and the issue of certificates of deposits is left out by market.There are multiple reasons that cause the changes in liability structure,and this paper comprehensively analyzes this in three levels—macro,supervision and bank.At macroscopic level,the growth rate of macro economy is slowing down;financial disintermediation is getting worse,and Internet finance is flourishing.At the supervision level,deposit insurance system was carried out,and market-oriented reform of interest rate has been accomplished.The monetary policy becomes prudent and neutral,and de-leveraging is getting more normal.At the bank level,banks are proactively changing their management philosophy about debts and increasing the allocation to initiative debts.In addition,this paper employs data of 16 listed banks from 2012 to 2017 and uses these data to construct panel data models.The paper also divides the whole sample into two subsamples—large banks and small and medium-sized banks.Then there is a regression analysis about the relationship between liability structure and insolvency risk of banks.The research shows that,generally changes in debt have no significant effects on bank risks,and non-deposit debts can increase bank risks.With respect to the two subsamples,changes in non-deposit debts can mitigate risk for large banks and for small and medium-sized banks on the contrary.At last,according to the theories and empirical results of this paper,suggestions are given as follows:in order to promote the change of liability structure and to prevent risks,conceptual change of banks,related regulations from supervision,and effective mechanism of market discipline are all necessary.All of the three need to function integrally.