Research On The Influence Of Management Power On Cost Stickiness

The management and control of enterprise cost is the area that managers pay attention to.Enterprises need to improve management efficiency,reduce cost,optimize operation management,adopt the most favorable decision to the future development of the enterprise and gain more income.The goal of the enterprise is to achieve the maximum profit,and the cost have a direct impact on the profit of the enterprise.It is necessary to further improve the profit level of the enterprise,enhance the competitiveness of the enterprise,and strengthen the management of the cost.How to better control the cost level,optimize the allocation of enterprise resources,this will become a valuable topic,and it is also a key problem that needs to be studied in cost management.Cost stickiness is an important concept in the field of cost accounting.Since it has been proposed,scholars have entered a new stage of research on cost of the company.More and more scholars have focused their research goals on the cost stickiness.Management has the right to determine the daily business activities of an enterprise.It has the right to determine the time?quantity and the direction of the investment of the company's resources.According to the cause of the stickiness concept of opportunism,the management may make use of power to make decisions in favor of its own interests,thus affecting the stickiness characteristics of the company's cost.The greater the power of the management,the more weak the internal governance and external supervision of the company can have influence on it,the more easily the manager will turn the opportunist behavior into practical action,thus deepening the agency problem.Many scholars believe that managerial power will have an impact on non-pecuniary consumption and over investment,which will lead to a series of agency problems.This paper studies the relationship between management power and cost stickiness,explores whether management uses power to rent in the field of cost,empirically examines the relationship between management power and corporate cost stickiness,and further studies the relationship between the three parties as the variable of non-pecuniary consumption as an intermediary variable.On this basis,robustness tests for models and hypotheses are conducted.Finally,we draw the conclusion of this paper and put forward relevant policy recommendations.The results show that:(1)the cost of Listed Companies in China is sticky.(2)management power has a significant impact on the cost stickiness of the company.Specifically,management power has a positive effect on cost stickiness.(3)introducing the variable of non-pecuniary consumption to further study,we find that non-pecuniary consumption plays an intermediary role in the relationship between management power and cost stickiness.The promotion effect of managerial power on cost stickiness can be conducted through non-pecuniary consumption.Accordingly,this paper puts forward some policy suggestions from the aspects of improving the internal governance mechanism of the company,strengthening the market construction of professional managers,increasing the information disclosure and increasing the cost of rent-seeking,in order to reduce the agency cost of the management and improve the management level of the company's cost.