Dynamic Pricing With Customer Costs In Two-sided Market

Rather than generalize 21 th century as the age of network information,it is better to define 21 th century as the era of electronic commerce.It is no exaggeration to say that electronic commerce has overturned traditional commercial and trade activities.The weak economic situation after the financial crisis,But the most closely related to people's daily life is the e-commerce platform based on the bilateral market theory.The further observation of the e-commerce platform with the characteristics of the bilateral market reveals that the platform is new to the new market.Old users have different operating costs,Price discrimination strategy based on user history information(BBPD)is widely used and repeated transactions by users.Based on this,this paper,based on bilateral market theory,constructs a single-period game,which is different from previous studies on multi-hypothesis that the service cost of multiple platforms is constant.Based on the two-stage dynamic game model of two-stage platform with no subdivision of user groups,this paper analyzes the influence of the cost difference between new and old users on the pricing,market share,platform profit and the choice of optimal strategy of the platform from the perspective of complete monopoly and duopoly competition.It is found that in the case of complete monopoly: the cost difference of the new buyer and the old buyer and the value range of the cross-network externality coefficient are different,and the optimal strategy of the platform is different.The increase of the cost of obtaining customers makes the platform have the intrinsic motivation to maintain all the old buyers.However,the increase in the cost of maintaining the old buyer makes the platform tend to abandon some of the old buyers and acquire new buyers.Moreover,the degree of cost differentiation determines that the ratio of the loss of the buyer to the quantity of acquisition.Compared with the uniform pricing,BBPD can help the platform achieve the dual goal of attracting more users and making more profits at the same time.Moreover,the BBPD enables the platform to have the following two goals: to achieve the goal of attracting more users and making more profits at the same time.Set a high price for the old buyer,However,due to the influence of cross-network externality,price reduction is not the inevitable choice for the platform to attract new buyers.In the case of duopoly competition:the differential pricing strategy can not change the market share of the platform.The market share of the platform is dominated by the cost difference.However,the pricing of the first stage of the platform for obtaining a larger market share may not necessarily reflect the marginal cost of the buyer in the second phase,which is influenced by the product of the cross-network externality and the cost difference.A platform with the advantage of cost of acquisition(maintenance cost)may not necessarily have a price advantage in the first phase(phase II),but the pricing of the second phase can reflect that the platform is subject to aggressive price discrimination,It is also a defensive price discrimination,which is influenced by the degree of the difference between the cost of acquisition(maintenance cost)between the platforms and the degree of cost difference between the new and the old buyers in the platform.The platform with cost advantage does not necessarily obtain profit advantage.Unlike the complete monopoly situation,BBPD can not help the platform to achieve the dual goal of attracting more users and getting more profit simultaneously in the case of duopoly competition.