Expected Performance Feedback,Industry Competition Pressures And Corporate Mergers And Acquisitions

M&A,as an important strategic choice,is one of the important means for companies to use external resources to achieve economies of scope and economies of scale and gain competitive advantage.In particular,in the period after the financial crisis,there will be more powerful companies.The "pursuit".As of now,the research literature on mergers and acquisitions has been quite rich.As one of the important research contents in the field of management,the enterprise behavior theory holds that the company's strategic decision-making depends on the psychological "satisfaction value" of the decision-making individual.Decision-makers are accustomed to determine the follow-up behavioral choice by expecting performance feedback results.However,it is expected that performance feedback is very important in the theory of corporate behavior,but it is rarely examined by the academic community and the M&A behavior.Moreover,few literatures combine organizational behavior with corporate commission-agent theory to explain M&A behavior.This paper will explain the mechanism of M&A behavior selection through theoretical analysis and empirical research,and expand the research on the theory of corporate behavior in the field of mergers and acquisitions;and from the perspective of the reality of game relationships between executives and shareholders,examine corporate governance from the perspective of corporate governance.The actual decision of M&A is also the main research purpose of this article.This article selects 101 companies from China's Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company as the main parallel merger and acquisition transaction events from 2011 to 2015.Based on the existing literature and theory,it makes empirical hypotheses and uses Eviews8.0 and Stata12.0 software.Statistical analysis,an empirical investigation of the quadratic curve relationship between expected performance feedback and corporate M&A,and discussion of the regulatory role of industry competition pressures on expected performance feedback and corporate M&A behaviors;reviewing state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises based on differences in corporate property attributes Whether there are differences in the choice of mergers and acquisitions by enterprises.The research content of the article is divided into six parts: the first part,the introduction,mainly includes the research background and significance,literature review,research content and methods,and innovation;the second part,theoretical analysis and research hypothesis;the third part,research design,mainly including sample selection,variable definition andmodel description;Section IV,empirical research,including descriptive analysis,correlation analysis,regression analysis and robustness test;Section V,extended research,exploring different property rights,expectation The impact of performance feedback on the merger and acquisition behavior of enterprises is different;Chapter VI,conclusions and inspirations.The research results show that:(1)When expected performance is a deficit,the expected performance gap is in an inverse U-shaped relationship with M&A behavior.That is,within a certain gap,the greater the expected performance gap,the more companies tend to adopt M&A methods to make up for the gap.And the scale of mergers and acquisitions is also greater;when the expected performance gap exceeds a certain threshold,the greater the gap,the less the companies will choose merger and acquisition strategies,and the smaller the scale of mergers and acquisitions.(2)The pressure of industry competition has a positive effect on the merger and acquisition of enterprises.The greater the pressure of competition in the industry,the greater the potential for managers to choose mergers and acquisitions.The scale of mergers and acquisitions will also expand with the intensification of competition,and the pressure of competition in the industry will have a regulatory effect on the expected performance gap and the relationship between corporate mergers and acquisitions.(3)Differences in the property rights of enterprises will affect the choice of M&A behaviors under the same expected performance gap: In the sample group of non-state-owned enterprises,the expectation of performance deficit is significant for the merger and acquisition behavior of enterprises;in the sample group of state-controlled enterprises,expectations The inverse U-shaped impact of performance deficit on corporate M&A behavior is not significant.When firms expect performance feedback to be negative,SOEs are more inclined to choose mergers and acquisitions and have greater intention of M&A scale.