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The Impact Of Product Market Competition And Executive Incentive On The Quality Of Accounting Information Disclosure

Posted on:2019-12-15Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J L ZhuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330563995490Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,financial fraud and accounting fraud have occurred frequently in China's listed companies,and the quality of accounting information disclosure is worrying.Senior executives are the decision-making bodies of accounting information disclosure of listed companies.In recent years,many enterprises have implemented executive incentives,hoping to have a positive impact on their decision-making behavior,and thus improve the quality of accounting information disclosure.In addition,product market competition as the external governance mechanism of the company,people also hope that the market pressure that it produces can promote the improvement of the quality of accounting information disclosure.In China's capital market,whether the two internal and external governance factors can affect the quality of accounting information disclosure,and what influence,and the common effect of internal and external governance factors,whether the product market competition has an impact on the relationship between executive incentive and the quality of accounting information disclosure.It needs to be verified.Therefore,this paper,taking all A shares listed companies of the Shenzhen stock exchange as the research sample,starts with the two ways of short-term monetary compensation and long-term equity incentive,and first examines the impact of executive incentive on the quality of accounting information disclosure,and then discusses the effect of product market competition on it.On the basis of the market competition of the listed companies,the influence of product market competition on the relationship between executive incentive and accounting information disclosure quality is further tested.Finally,based on the results of empirical analysis,the policy suggestions are put forward for the listed companies to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure.The results show that:(1)there is a significant positive correlation between executive incentive and the quality of accounting information disclosure.That is,executive incentive is helpful to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure;(2)there is a significant positive correlation between product market competition and the quality of accounting information disclosure,that is,the higher the competition in the industry,the quality of the disclosure of accounting information is also The better;(3)the product market competition will strengthen the positive correlation between the executive incentive and the quality of accounting information disclosure;compared to the low competition industry,the effect of executive incentive on the quality of accounting information disclosure in the high competition industry is more significant,that is,the mutual complement between the product market competition and the executive incentive.On this basis,this paper further suggests that the listed companies in China should improve the accounting information disclosure appraisal mechanism and strengthen the supervision of the capital market,rationally formulate the executive incentive mechanism and establish the competition system dominated by the product market so as to promote the improvement of the quality of accounting information disclosure.
Keywords/Search Tags:Accounting Information Disclosure Quality, Executive Incentives, Product Market Competition
PDF Full Text Request
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