Research On Control Contest And Management Agent

Control right is the key factor of corporate governance.The allocation of control right is a state of game equilibrium among the relevant stakeholders of the contract.The incompleteness of the contract has turn the initial configuration of control right into the vital factor.At the same time,the allocation of control right is a direct embodiment of the equity-entrusted agency relationship.However,there are some problems such as inconsistent goals and asymmetric information between shareholders and managers,resulting in contradictions and conflicts happening between them.In the contention of the control right,the agency problem between managers and shareholders will be exacerbated.Based on the theories of principal-agent,market for corporate control and financial management objective,this article establishes its own theoretical framework to explore the mutual influence between agency problems and the contentions of the control rights.Taking the control contest of Vanke as an example,it tries to put forward a countermeasures to ameliorate the management agency problem.After introducing the current situation of the development of the control rights market in China,this article sorts out the origin and development of the competition for Vanke control right and reveals that the dispersion of equity and the undervaluation of stock prices are the direct reason for the control contest of Vanke.It is the competition for control that exposes the Vanke Group Management agency problem.The control right market can identify and correct the effects of corporate governance.This struggle for control right plays a supervisory role in Vanke's management,helps solving agency problems and prompts management to return to the goal of maximizing shareholders' wealth.It is an effective external governance mechanism.Therefore,this article finally concludes that listed companies must pay attention to the management agency problem,continuously strengthen the level of corporate governance,reduce agency costs,protect the interests of shareholders,and ease the conflict between managers and shareholders.At the same time,it is necessary to strengthen the restraint function of external governance on enterprises,give full play to the self-regulation function of capital market,and promote the healthy development of the market-oriented reform of M& A and reorganization in China.