Research On The Relationship Between Heterogeneous Institutional Investors And Corporate Performance

Since the 1980 s,with the continuous expansion of the fund size of institutional investors,the scale of securities investment by institutional investors has become increasingly large.Some institutional investors abandon the original principle of "voting by their feet" and take the initiative to participate in the governance of listed companies.Shareholders activism began to rise in the west.Institutional investors have advantages over individual investors in participating in the governance of listed companies,but scholars have not yet reached a completely consistent conclusion as to whether institutional investors are involved in the governance of listed companies or whether they can affect the performance of the company.Although our institutional investors started relatively lately,with the support of the development strategy of "unconventional development institutional investors" put forward in 2000,the development in recent years has been very rapid.Therefore,in the current environment,whether institutional investors in our country can play a governance role in the process of investing in listed companies to improve the performance of listed companies and how to play a governance role should be the focus of current concern.In response to this problem,this article selects executive compensation as a research focus.This paper first reviews the existing relevant research literature both at home and abroad,sorts out the relevant theories of institutional investors' participation in the governance of listed companies to improve the performance of the company,and analyzes whether different institutional investors have the ability toparticipate in the governance of listed companies according to relevant literature and related theories Independence and initiative of China's institutional investors.Based on this,we classify our institutional investors into two different types: pressureresistant institutional investors and pressure-sensitive institutional investors,and then conduct research separately.Because of the de facto independence of pressuredistorting institutional investors and listed companies that are not listed,they have the de facto independence and the benefits of participating in the governance of listed companies are greater than their costs,so they have the initiative to take part in the governance of listed companies.Pressure-sensitive institutional investors,however,do not have the incentive to participate in the governance of listed companies because of their commercial relationships with listed companies or their desire to establish business relationships.Based on this,this paper puts forward the hypothesis and takes the 2012-2015 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as the research sample.Through regression analysis,it finds that there is a positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of the pressure-resistance institutional investors and the performance of listed companies,The correlation is significant at1% level,while there is no significant correlation between pressure-sensitive institutional investors and the performance of listed companies.Incentive executive compensation is a way for pressure-resistant institutional investors to improve the performance of listed companies.Executive compensation is the mediating variable of the shareholding of investors in pressure-resisting institutions and the performance of listed companies.