Research On The Credit Guaranty Mechanism Of Small And Medium-sized Enterprises Financing

In recent years,the establishment of credit guaranty system has alleviated the financing difficulties of SMEs in some degree and opened a new way for SMEs to finance.As a bridge between SME and banking institution,credit guaranty can alleviate the information asymmetry effectively between the two,meanwhile,promote the interaction and circulation of information in the credit process.Nevertheless,the operation of credit guaranty institutions in the domestic is far less ideal than foreign.Nowadays,China's guarantee magnification is low and the guaranty time is short,there are many SMEs have difficulty in financing none the less in C hina.There is no doubt that the introduction of credit guaranty is conducive to the financing of SMEs,but the efficiency of secured financing is low and needs to be improved further.This paper focus on the operation mechanism and operation mode of credit guaranty,conducts an analysis based on the related model of game theory,so as to provide some useful suggestions for improving the efficiency of guaranty financing in C hina.The main points focus on the following aspects:First,the analysis of credit guaranty mode for SMEs.By establishing the SME,guaranty institution and bank`s return model which under the full guaranty and proportional guaranty different credit guarantee model.The analysis found that the proportional guaranty model is more likely to facilitate the SME`S credit business than the full guarantee,which is more conducive to corporate credit financing,and also beneficial to the long-term development of the guaranty institutions.Second,the analysis of operation process of credit guaranty mechanism for SMEs.Combined with the actual operation situation of SME?S credit financing,based on game theory,this section constructs a three-way signaling game model for SMEs,banks and guaranty organizations;analyzes the behavioral strategies of each party in the credit process;establishes the corresponding revenue function and analyzes the equilibrium solution.The analysis shows that after guaranty agency who select high-quality enterprises and extract inferior enterprises by paying signal screening cost making the best action strategy,the bank makes the credit plan according to the actions of the guaranty institution,and finally realizes the refined Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.Last,the design of incentive contract for SMEs under credit guaranty financing.In the process of accepting the guaranty business,the guaranty organization at an informational disadvantage is easily deceived by the low-quality enterprises after whitewashing and disguising,which increases the reimbursement rate and its risk level.In order to reduce the reimbursement rate of the guaranty institution,the fourth chapter designs the incentive contract based on the angle of the guaranty institution to encourage the SMEs invest in low-risk projects and perform the repayment,thus reducing the reimbursement rate and weakening the risk level of the guaranty institution.