Study On The Influence Of Management Defense On Corporate Governance

With the successive opening of Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect,Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect,and mainland investment The understanding of the interconnection and interconnection mechanism has deepened,and the supervision mechanism has been continuously improved and innovated.More mainland funds have sought the target in the Hong Kong market,and there have been some cros s-border mergers and acquisitions of industrial capital.This indicates that A-share companies have acquired Hong Kong through the Hong Kong Stock Connect channel.The company will become a new normal,one of the main lines that cannot be ignored is acquisition and anti-takeover.The hostile takeover is the first case of public acquisition by investors from the A-share market through the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect channel,which is of great significance.In the face of strong and aggressive sponsors,it has taken a series of defensive measures to successfully repel the hostile bidder.Based on principal-agent theory and stewardship theory,this paper comprehensively analyzes the reasons and specific methods adopted by the management of Shenzhou Holdings,and the effectiveness of the management after successful management of the hostile acquier,and finds that the management defense reduces the level of corporate governance.After analysis,it is found that it is precisely because of the counter-acquisition strategy to reduce the threat of hostile takeovers,the problem of entrusted agents caused by insider control increases,and the Hong Kong capital market share allotment system provides an opportunity for anti-takeover.Therefore,this article believes that in the face of hostile takeovers,management should stand in the perspective of the interests of shareholders as a whole,and cannot make “management defense” a tool for management to resist hostile takeovers in order to protect personal interests.