| The relationship between venture capital and high-tech companies has always been one of the focuses of the academic community.High-tech enterprises,as the special existence of integrating technological innovation,undertake the mission of transforming technological innovation capabilities into the real economy,and have become one of the important enterprises in the national economy.In the process of high-tech enterprise development,investment efficiency is the original driving force for its long-term development.Non-efficiency investment is an irrational investment behavior that deviates from the optimal investment decision and damages the interests of the enterprise,including over-investment and under-investment.At two levels,the emergence of high-tech enterprises after the listing is relatively common,which has seriously affected the development of high-tech enterprises and led to a decrease in their survival rate.At the same time,venture capital with good governance experience and reputational advantages is an important tool for promoting the development of high-tech enterprises.Due to the existence of equity splitting,the exit mechanism in the capital market is hindered,and after helping some high-tech enterprises to go public,Stay in the company.Therefore,the scientific issues extracted in this paper focus on whether the venture capital that remains in listed high-tech companies will also use its own internal governance and external reputation advantages to help post-listed high-tech enterprises to mitigate the formation of inefficient investments,and indirectly help them.Its long-term development? The increasingly fierce competition in the world economy,the formation of the new normal state of the economy,and the implementation of innovation-driven strategies are urgently needed,all of which reflect the urgency of studying this issue.This issue has become a theoretical and practical academic issue.Based on this,this article follows the logical thinking from theoretical research to empirical research to policy research.Based on the combination of normative researchand empirical research,we use the results of inefficient investment in listed high-tech companies as the starting point to standardize non-efficiency investment.For the purpose of this study,we will study how venture capital can alleviate the problems of non-efficiency investment in listed high-tech companies,in order to provide decision-making ideas and empirical support for national policy formulation and adjustment.Specifically,in the theoretical research part,the definition of venture capital,high-tech companies,and non-efficiency investment shows that non-efficiency investment can be divided into two situations: over-investment and under-investment.Based on the principles of principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,contract theory,and social network theory,this paper analyzes in detail the over-investment and under-investment aspects of non-efficiency investment.On the one hand,based on the connotation of non-efficiency investment,the paper analyzes the formation path of non-efficiency investment of high-tech enterprises in China.It is clear that agency conflicts and information asymmetry will trigger the formation of over-investment and under-investment,respectively.On the other hand,based on the formation path of non-efficiency investment,a theoretical analysis framework for the mechanism of venture capital influencing non-efficiency investment of high-tech enterprises was constructed,and it was proposed that “risk investment can relieve the freedom caused by agency conflict by exerting incentive and supervisory functions.The abuse of cash flow eventually inhibits the formation of over-investment in high-tech companies."The risk investment can alleviate the shortage of free cash flow caused by asymmetric information through direct capital injection and indirect financing,and ultimately alleviate the formation of under-investment in high-tech enterprises." Two research hypotheses.In the empirical research section,based on the Richardson(2006)residual measurement model,we measure the over-investment and under-investment in the non-efficiency investment of 196 listed high-tech companies in China during2008-2016.On the basis of the measurement results,this paper empirically analyzes the impact of venture capital on the over-investment and under-investment in non-efficient investment.Finally,based on the robustness of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis,corresponding optimization measures are proposed to find a breakthrough for improving the risk investment field and helping the sustainable development of high-tech enterprises.Conclusion:(1)The inefficient investment of listed high-tech companies in China frequently appears,and shows the situation of excessive investment and insufficientinvestment coexistence.(2)Risk investment can mitigate the abuse of free cash flow triggered by agency conflicts and ultimately suppress the formation of over-investment in high-tech companies.(3)Risk investment can alleviate the shortage of free cash flow caused by information asymmetry,and ultimately alleviate the formation of investment in high-tech companies.(4)By contrast,risk investment mitigates the lack of investment in listed high-tech and non-efficient investment is greater than the suppression of excessive investment.In the end,it can be concluded that risk investment from the two aspects of over-investment and under-investment ultimately mitigated the formation of inefficient investment in listed high-tech companies.In view of the above-mentioned relevant conclusions,this paper proposes the following four policy recommendations:(1)Improve the internal governance and information disclosure mechanisms of high-tech enterprises and ease the formation of non-efficient investments.(2)Introduce venture capital,improve the internal governance system of high-tech enterprises,and help them ease the formation of inefficient investments.(3)Improve the professional level of venture capital and increase the intensity of its inefficient investment governance.(4)Establish a multi-level capital market,build a flexible and smooth access channel for venture capital,and help them better play a governance role for non-efficient investment. |
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