Venture Capital,Earnings Managementand Market Performance After IPO Lockup Expiration

Earnings management is generated when management uses discretionary power to change the earnings information of financial report to mislead investors how to judge the potential performance and quality of the business.As an important opportunity for the first withdrawal of the listed companies' Limited shares,the listed companies have the motivation to use earnings management to raise the stock price and reduce the profit before the time point of the IPO lockup expiration.The appearance of earnings management aggravates the asymmetry of the internal and external information of the listed companies.With the coming of the ban,the selling of the original stock and the reduction of the effect of earnings management will cause the negative reaction of the market to the stock price of the listed companies,which will cause the stock price to fall down substantially and bring unnecessary losses to the outside investors.Previous studies suggest that the supervisory role of venture capital can reduce the asymmetry of this information and alleviate the fall of the stock price,but some scholars believe that,based on the rate of return on investment,venture capital institutions will use professional means to assist management to achieve higher level of "false" performance and expand the internal and external information.The degree of asymmetry increases the negative reaction of the market.So,how do s controlling shareholders identify this behavior? Will all venture capital participation exacerbate this phenomenon? Is there an individual type of venture capital for value investment and industry reputation,and will choose to use supervision and other functions to mitigate this relationship? At present,the academic circle has not yet fully analyzed the relationship between the three parties in the period of the ban.Therefore,based on agency theory and signal theory,this paper establishes a research framework for earnings management behavior in the period of IPO lockup expiration,and explores the impact of earnings management on external capital market from the perspective of venture capital institutions' participation in behavior and motivation.In this paper,330 GEM listed companies as the research object,using the modified Jones model,multiple regression model and event research method,influence the behavior of earnings management of Listed Companies in the test ban on post market and risk investment institutions in which the role of.Through the preliminary statistical analysis and empirical test of the data,the following conclusions are obtained:(1)the earnings management before the IPO lockup is significantly positively correlated with the negative market performance after the IPO lockup expiration;(2)compared with the enterprises free of venture investment,the enterprises with venture investment participated,the earnings management behavior before the IPO lockup has the stronger positive correlation with the negative market performance;(3)compared with nonstate-owned venture capital institutions,the participation of state-owned venture capital institutions weakens the positive correlation between earnings management and negative market performance;(4)compared with low reputation venture capital,high reputation venture capital also weakens the positive correlation between earnings management and negative market performance.Finally,we need to point out that the influence of single-invest venture capital on the relationship between earnings management and passive market performance has not been verified.