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Supervision Or Collusion-the Effect On Supervisory Board Governance By Ownership Structure And Reward Incentive Mechanism

Posted on:2019-03-10Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y XieFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330566999668Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the development of market economy and mixed-ownership reform,higher and higher demands about corporate governance are replaced by the corporate with different Ownership Structure and reward incentive mechanism.As the significant part of the structure of corporate governance in China,the supervisory board should alleviate various types of principal-agent problems,exert the effect of governance and promote corporate efficiency.From the aspect of supervisory board's choice of supervision or collusion,this research tries to discuss the effect of different Ownership Structure for the choice of supervisory board.Accordingly,based on linear-regression analysis of panel data by Fixed effect model via Stata12 and selecting companies from 2006 to 2016 of the main board and second Board listed A shares in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange Market as the research object,this research,divides data into groups by concentration ratio of shares,suggest hypotheses about the relationships among concentration ratio of shares,incentive rewards of the supervisory board and corporate efficiency and verifies.It shows that :(1)Higher concentration ratio of shares will lead the supervisory board to collusion,and corporate efficiency will be reduced.(2)Higher fixed rewards and incentive rewards of the supervisory board lead the supervisory board to collusion,and corporate efficiency will be reduced.(3)Among the companies with dispersed ownership,the higher fixed rewards of the board of supervisors has a slightly greater inhibitory effect on company performance;Among the companies with concentrated ownership,the higher incentive rewards of the supervisory board has a slightly larger inhibitory effect on company performance.Explanations come to be that the incentive effects of fixed rewards and incentive rewards of the supervisory board are distorted.And similar problems may be faced by the companies with different ownership structures.It raised advices such as the optimization of stock ownership structure and Improvement of incentive system of the supervisory board.
Keywords/Search Tags:Ownership structure, Supervisory board supervision, Supervisory board collusion, Reward incentive mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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